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“Great Britain is under weightier obligation to no mortal man than to this very villain. For 
whereby the occurrences whereof he is the author, her greatness prosperity, and wealth, have 
attained their present elevation.” 
A Prussian General’s reference to Napoleon at the Congress of Vienna, 1815
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Abstract 
This revised and reconfigured essay surveys a range of printed secondary sources going back to publications 
of the day (as well as includes research in primary sources) in order to revive a traditional and unresolved 
debate on economic connexions between the French and Industrial Revolutions. It argues that the 
costs flowing from the reallocation of labour, capital and technical knowledge to wage warfare from 1793-
1815 have been overstated in relation to a range of benefits that accrued from: crowding out a potential 
invasion by Napoleon’s armies; improvements to the skills and discipline of the workforce; the integration 
of Ireland into a national market; the accelerated diffusion of technologies associated with coal and iron; the 
circumvention of diminishing returns to agriculture and above all from a victory that provided the economy 
with a more efficient State, Navy and Merchant Marine that, for a century, retained most of the gains from 
trade and servicing the international economy obtained at the expense of rivals during these long wars with 
France. 
 
My conclusion is that the costs and benefits (derived from participation in a global war from 1793 to 1815, 
that was integral to the era’s geopolitical and mercantilist international economic order) cannot be 
measured. But in the context and history of that order it is difficult to represent their outcome as 
anything other than positive and significant for the consolidation and progress of Britain’s famous 
transition to become Europe’s First Industrial Nation. 
 
Keywords: Industrial Revolution, French Revolution, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Warfare and 
Economic Growth, Fiscal States, Sovereign Debts, Balance of Payments, Naval Hegemony, Mercantilism 
JEL classification codes: B, E, G, J, N, O, Y 
 
∗ Revised Working Paper, LSE Department of Economic History, 150/2011. Not to be cited without permission from: 
p.o’brien@sant.ox.ac.uk. I wish to thank Phil Hoffman, Stan Engerman, Mark Harrison and Javier Cuenca Esterban and 
the participants in the Waterloo Network for their comments and help with this paper 
1 A Prussian general’s reference to Napoleon at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 cited by A.D. Harvey, 
Collision of Empires. Britain in Three World Wars 1793-1815 (London, 1992), p. 111 
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1. Quantifying the Impact of Warfare upon Economic Growth 
 
Between the Peace of Paris (1763) and the adoption of free trade 
(1846-49) the economy of the United Kingdom passed through an 
accelerated phase of industrialization and urbanization, referred to as the 
First Industrial Revolution. For more than a third of that time the British 
state was: extracting and mobilizing resources (labour, capital, raw 
materials, intermediate and consumption goods) for purposes of: 
preparing, waging and disengaging from warfare with enemies from the 
mainland of Europe, failing to repress rebellions by colonists in the 
Americas, and defeating Indian, Chinese and other armed forces in 
various parts of the world.
2
 
 
 
The wars conducted between 1793 and 1815 in the middle of this 
famous conjuncture in British economic history should be 
comprehended historiographically (as they were by contemporaries) as 
part of an era of mercantilist competition accompanied by violent strife, 
going back to the First Anglo-Dutch war of 1651. The interludes from 
1793-1815 will be represented here as the culmination of a connected 
sequence of wars that accompanied the rise of the realm to the position 
of geopolitical, commercial and economic hegemony that it occupied 
for something like a century after the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, when 
“Britain’s military and diplomatic prestige touched a pitch it has never 
reached before or since.” 
3
 
 
 
Connexions between around fourteen politically distinct conflicts and the 
long-run growth of the national economy preoccupied statesmen and their 
mercantilist advisers between 1651 and 1815.4 They conceived of clear 
and positive correlations between power and profit. As Charles  
Wilson observed: their “logic was the logic of violence in an age of 
 
 
 
 
2 D. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1967) and D. 
McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815 (London, 1983) and 
P. Marshall, (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vols. 1-3 (Oxford, 1998) 
3 The quote is from Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad and Dangerous People. England 1783- 
1846 (Oxford, 2006), p. 237;  J.R. Jones, Britain and the World, 1649-1815 (Brighton, 
1980) and L. Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War from 1689-1815 (London, 1994). J. 
Black, Trade, Empire and British Foreign Policy 1689-1815 (London, 2007). 
4  L. Gomes, Foreign Trade and the National Economy (London, 1987) and T.W. 
Hutchinson, Before Adam Smith The Emergence of Political Economy (Oxford, 1988). 
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violence”.5  That logic has been derogated by the dominant tradition in 
English political economy running from Adam Smith to Maynard Keynes 
which has influenced generations of liberal economic historians to 
regard all wars as inimical for material progress and the welfare of 
British society.6 
 
 
There is a literature, even a journal on the economics of war. Both 
economists and modern historians are explicably chary in entering 
debates that attempt to investigate the economic consequences of wars. 
Historians tend to concentrate upon their origins and political outcomes 
for states and, by extension, institution formation in early modern 
Europe. 7  Economists prefer more manageable research into the costs of 
mobilizing resources for engagement in power politics.8 
 
Clearly conjectures about outcomes from wars for the histories of  
national economies will be much more difficult to support with evidence 
hard enough to draw inferences about their benefits as well as their costs 
or to measure connexions between active involvement in armed conflicts 
with rival powers on the one hand, and long-term material progress on 
the other.9 
 
 
 
 
5 C. Wilson, England’s Apprenticeship, 1603-1763 (New York, 1968), p. 67 and K Tribe, 
‘Mercantilism and the Economics of State Formation’ in L. Magnusson (ed.), 
Mercantilist Economics (Northwell, 1993), pp. 175-86; E . and S. Reinert, 
‘Mercantilism and Economic Development: Schumpeterian Dynamics, Institution 
Building and International Benchmarking’ in K. S. Jomo and E. Reinert (eds.), 
Development Economics. How Schools of Economic Thought have Addressed 
Development (London, 2005). 
6 E. Silberner, The Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought 
(Princeton, 1946) and J. Brauer and H. Van Tulyll, How Economists Explains Military 
History (Chicago, 2008). 
7 F. Lane, Profits from Power. Readings in Protection, Rent and Violence (Albany, 
1979); P.W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics (Oxford, 1992) and 
S. Baxter , (ed.), England’s Rise to Greatness (Berkeley, 1983). 
8  V.W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and 
Technology Development (Oxford, 2006). E.L. Bogart, Direct and Indirect Costs of the 
Great War (New York, 1920); A.O. Bowley, Some Economic Consequences of the 
Great War (London, 1930); G. Kennedy, Defense Economics (London, 1983); S.N. 
Broadberry, ‘The Impact of World Wars on the Long Run Performance of the British 
Economy’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 4 (1988), pp. 25-37; T. Sandler and K. 
Hartley, The Economics of Defence (Cambridge, 1995).
4 
 
 
 
Engagements in war may have delayed, accelerated or arrested 
economic development. Counterfactuals are certainly implicit in any 
enquiry that poses the meta question about their economic 
consequences. Economists remain commendably explicit in the 
parsimonious methods they utilize to deal with that key question. 
Impatient with history, they cut through detailed investigations into the 
impact of armed conflicts upon the factors of production (labour, capital, 
natural endowments and technology) behind economic growth. They  
avoid difficulties involved in disaggregating the effects of mobilization 
upon the distinct sectors and industries that make up national 
economies. They make heroic assumptions that, in the absence of 
conflict, rates of growth for national incomes, industrial and agricultural 
outputs, labour productivities, consumption per capita and other macro-
indicators of development would have continued on trends observed 
and measured for runs of pre-war years. Cliometricians posit that: 
without the interruptions and diversions associated with warfare these 
trends (as represented on several varieties of growth curves invented by 
statisticians) would have persisted; that deviations from them are 
imputable to the malign effects of reallocating resources from the civilian 
economy into purposes connected directly or indirectly to armed conflict. 
Estimated declines below trends represent the costs of war which cease 
to effect  long run growth once national economies are back upon 
“normal” paths for growth.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
9 A. Milward, The Economic Effects of Two World Wars on Britain (London, 1984); R. 
Andreano (ed.), The Economic Impact of the American Civil War (Cambridge, Mass., 
1967); H.G. Vatter, The US Economy in World War II (New York, 1985). For recent 
attempts to construct theories that draw connexions between warfare and state 
formation vide T. Besley and T. Persson, ‘Wars and State Capacity’, in Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 2 (2009), pp. 522-30. 
10 S. Kuznets, Postwar Economic Growth (New Haven, 1954); C. Goldin and F. 
Lewis,‘The Economic Cost of the American Civil War,’ in Journal of Economic 
History, 35 (1975), p. 299-327 and C. Goldin and F. Lewis, ‘The Postwar. Recovery 
of the South and the Cost of the Civil War,’ Journal of Economic History, 38 (1978), 
pp. 487-492.
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These macro statistical exercises draw attention to familiar 
connexions. Firstly, that: war reduces a country’s capacity for steady 
growth; secondly, that social deprivation - in terms of private consumption 
foregone - and investment diverted, measured as a reallocation of 
investible savings to support expenditures by the state - rises in wartime, 
but then steadily diminishes when recovery carries national economies 
forward again;. Some recognize that wars were followed by shifts in the 
relative geopolitical positions of countries and their potential for future 
growth within the global economy at large.
11 
 
 
Most historians of early modern Europe will not be convinced that 
trends in production, investment or consumption could be defined ex post 
on the basis of accessible information for runs of so-called normal years, 
extrapolated forward through periods of war and recovery until an economy 
is back upon some kind of linear path for growth. They anticipate that more 
heuristic insights into the outcomes of early modern warfare might flow from 
investigations conducted war by war, factor by factor, sector by sector. 
They insist upon the separation of chronologies and perspectives so that 
distinctions can be made between immediate and short-term impacts and 
longer term structural effects of warfare upon the growth of Europe’s 
competing national economies.12 
 
 
 
 
 
  
11 M. Harrison, ‘Resource Mobilization for World War II: the USA, UK, USSR and 
Germany, 1938-15,’ in Economic History Review, 41 (1988), pp. 171-93; S. Broadberry 
and M. Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War I (Cambridge, 2005) ; K. 
O’Rourke, ‘The Worldwide Economic Impact of the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,’ in Journal of Global History, 1 (2006), pp. 123-49; R. 
Findlay and K. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty. Trade, War and the World Economy in the 
Second Millennium (Princeton, 2007). 
12 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Global Warfare and Long Term Economic Development, 1789-1939,’ 
in War in History, 3 (1996) pp. 437-50.
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2. Mercantilism, Warfare and the Rise of the British Economy 
 
Partly to avoid the almost insurmountable theoretical and empirical 
difficulties involved as well as a liberal antipathy to the very notion that the 
celebrated and precocious industrialization of the offshore  island can be 
plausibly represented as Europe’s paradigm case of effective 
mercantilism, British economic history is not replete with a significant 
volume of historical research and debate into the costs and benefits of the 
states largely successful engagement in a sequence of wars and 
numerous minor conflicts with other European and Asian powers between 
1651-1846.13 
 
As John Brewer, Lawrence Stone, Huw Bowen, Stephen Conway 
and others discovered when they published recent surveys of what is 
after all a major theme in British history, the anticipated programme of 
research, publication and discourse (concerned to synthesize connexions 
between warfare and the long run growth of the British or any other 
national economy) for an era of mercantilism is not out there in anything 
like the volume and depth the topic warrants.14 
 
Long ago Ashton published an acute analysis of the influences of 
warfare on economic fluctuations during the 18th century and rejected 
John’s suggestions that expenditures by the army and navy on weapons, 
ships and equipment promoted any kind of significant stimulus for 
industrial production and technological innovation before 1760.15 Jones, 
Conway and Crouzet have all published excellent books and articles, 
tracing the impact of wars on sectors of the British economy (particularly  
 
 
 
 
 
13 Recently published textbooks devote very few pages to the analysis of connexions 
between warfare and British industrialization despite the fact that they proceeded in 
tandem. Vide P. Hudson, The Industrial Revolution (London, 1992); M. Daunton, 
Progress and Poverty. An Economic and Social History of Britain, 1700-1850 (Oxford, 
1995); R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern 
Britain, vol. 1 Industrialization 1700-1860 (Cambridge, 2004) and R.C. Allen, The 
British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective (Cambridge, 2009); J. Mokyr, The 
Enlightened Economy. An Economic History of Britain (London, 2009). 
14 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power, War, Money and the English State 1683-1783 
(London, 1989); L. Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War (London, 1994) ; H. Bowen, 
War and British Society, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, 1998); S. Conway, The British Isles 
and the War of American Independence (Oxford, 2000). 
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trade and shipping) during the course of three major periods of warfare: 
1689-1713, 1776-83 and 1803-15.16 Anglo-Dutch rivalry and mercantile 
conflicts has attracted scholarship of the highest quality from Israel, 
Ormrod, and De Vries and Van der Woude.17 Very little has been 
published on economic outcomes imputable to the War of Austrian 
Succession, 1739-48, the watershed Seven Years War of 1756-63 or 
those relatively minor conflicts with Sweden and Spain in the 1720s, 
1770s and 1780s.18 
 
Although the bibliography in international history includes 
substantial volumes of evidence and some pertinent insights into 
economic outcomes the concerns of most historians are basically with the 
immediate problems and shorter term effects flowing from: the 
mobilization of resources; from victories, defeats, taxes, loans and 
monetary policies that operated while conflicts were in progress; 
supplemented by ad hoc assessments of the territorial losses incurred or 
gains that accrued from peace treaties concluded at the end of wars.19 
 
 Economic historians have adopted more structuralist and 
comparative approaches by exploring multiple examples of mobilization 
for warfare by several European polities and their connexions to the 
formation of organizations – primarily to service their geopolitical policies, 
but which over time contributed to the establishment of comparative 
advantages including the formation of more centralized and efficient 
states, evolving to protect and sustain institutions that promoted the 
development of national interests. This recent wave of research has 
recognized the inseparable connexions between warfare, state formation, 
competitive advantages and the construction of favourable and/or 
restrictive institutions for long term growth.20 
 
______________________________________________ 
15 T.S. Ashton Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800 (Oxford, 1959) and A. 
John, ‘War and the English Economy, 1700-1763,’ in Economic History Review, 7 
(1955), pp. 329-44. 
16 D.W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 
1989); Conway, The British Isles and the American War of Independence; S. Conway, 
War, State and Society in mid-Eighteenth Century Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 2006); F. 
Crouzet, L’Economie Britannique et Le Blocus Continental (2nd ed., Paris, 1987) 
17 J. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford, 1989); J. De Vries and 
A. Van Der Woude, The First Modern Economy. Success, Failure and Perseverance of 
the Dutch Economy 1500-1815 (Cambridge, 1997); D. Ormrod, The Rise of 
Commercial Empires. England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, 1650- 
1770 (Cambridge, 2003); P. K. O’Brien, ‘Mercantilsm and Imperialism and the Rise and 
Decline of the Dutch and British Economies’, in De Economist, 148 (2000), pp. 148- 
501. 
18 Bowen, War and British Society; D. Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 1756-1763,  
(London, 2011). 
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For example, several of the institutions established for defence and 
internal order by England’s republican regime during and in the wake of 
the Civil War (including an enlarged standing navy, the taxation of 
domestic production by way of excise duties and a reformulated strategy 
for the implementation of navigation acts) embodied long term spinoffs 
and externalities for private capital formation and innovation in domestic  
agriculture and industry, as well as the Island’s trade, shipping, 
commercial services and colonization overseas. The political consensus 
and organizational capacities that sustained Britain’s well-funded fiscal 
naval state emerged during an interregnum of republican rule and 
continued during the restoration of monarchy. Thereafter it evolved over 
time to supply several public goods of real significance for businessmen 
operating in the home economy and protected their investment and 
enterprise overseas. By increasing control over a unifying kingdom, the 
state provided firms with: external security against invasion, internal 
stability, the rigorous enforcement of private property rights, a bellicose 
foreign policy linked to an ideology of xenophobia, supporting cultures of 
deference to hierarchy and, above all, compliance with the taxation 
allocated by an ancien regime for naval (and military) protection and for 
imperial expansion overseas. 21 
 
As the level, scope and stability of tax revenues accruing to the 
restored monarchical regime increased, Britain’s ruling aristocratic elite 
became more confident that their state could fund (basically through the 
medium of debt accumulation), more aggressive geopolitical and 
mercantilist policies against the country’s economic rivals including: the 
Netherlands, Spain, Scandinavia and Russia and above all France, for 
 
 
 
 
 
19 Typified by the scholarship displayed in the writings and volumes edited by Philippe 
Contamine and Jeremy Black. Vide J. Black, (ed.), European Warfare, 1453-1815 
(Basingstoke, 1999), and P. Contamine (ed.), War and Competition Between States 
(Oxford, 2000). For economic history the tradition, represented in seminal books by R. 
Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry (London, 1962) and C. Wilson, 
England’s Apprenticeship, has not attracted much new research in recent years. But 
vide: A. Page, Britain and the Seventy Years War, 1740-1815 (Basingstoke, 2014). 
20 Surveyed and fully referenced in three recent volumes: L. Prados de la Escosura 
(ed.), Exceptionalism and Industrialization. Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815 
(Cambridge, 2004); R. Torres Sanchez, War, State and Development. Fiscal Military 
States in the Eighteenth Century (Pamploma, 2007) and the bibliography cited in his 
book by M. Dincecco, Political Transformation and Public Finances in Europe 
(Cambridge, 2011). 
21 P.K. O’Brien, ‘State Formation and the Construction of Institutions for the First 
Industrial Nation,’ in H.J. Chang (ed.), Institutional Change and Economic 
Development (New York, 2007), pp. 177-98.
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the gains from trade and colonization over an era of European 
imperialism and expansion of world commerce. By the close of the 
Seven Years War, 1756-63, the realm’s aristocratic and plutocratic elites 
had consolidated a political consensus, behind Britain’s fiscal and 
financial systems, invested heavily in naval power to defend the realm, 
commanded a military apparatus to deter challenges to property and 
could rely upon a culture of nationalism and deference to hierarchy to 
sustain drives for expansion overseas and ambitions to become Europe’s 
hegemonic power.22 
 
Although the American tax rebellion, which developed into open 
conflict with other European powers, can be represented as an avoidable 
and expensive setback for the British state and its mercantilist strategy for 
growth, after the Peace of Paris (1783) slow recovery occurred. The king 
and Parliament simply gave up on their pretensions to tax and regulate the 
economic affairs of “subjects” living and working 3000 miles from 
London.23 
 
   Commerce with the Americas then resumed.24 Pitt the Younger and 
his able advisers began to reform and reorganize the Island state’s fiscal 
and financial system in order to regain the realm’s geopolitical and 
commercial lead over rivals from the mainland.25 The economy appears to 
have been back on track when Britain’s  unreformed system of 
parliamentary government and the kingdom’s propertied elites were 
confronted by the most sustained and expensive challenge to the political 
security, stability and economic prosperity of the Isles since attacks by 
Spanish Armadas in the late 16th century.26 
 
 
 
 22 P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Nature and Historical Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and       
its Possible Significance for the Precocious Commercialization and Industrialization of 
the British Economy from Cromwell to Nelson in Economic History Review, 64 (2011), 
pp.427-48. 
23 S. Conway, The War of American Independence, 1775-83 (London, 1995). 
24 R.C. Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy,’ 
in P.A. Coclonis (ed.), The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries (Columbia, South Carolina, 2005), pp. 95-152; N.F. Koehn, The Power of 
Commerce, Economy and Governance in the First British Empire (Ithaca, 1994);P.K. 
Liss, Atlantic Empires: the Networks of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826 (Princeton, 
1983). 
25 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt. The Years of Acclaim (London, 1969) and R. Rayment, 
‘The Income and Expenditure of Great Britain of the last Seven Years,’ (London, 1791: 
Goldsmiths’ Collection, University of London Library). 
26 H.D. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution (London, 1989) and Harvey, 
Collision of Empires.
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3. Fiscal and Financial Costs of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars 1793-1815 
 
 
The appropriation of revenues (taxes with loans) to fund the real 
resources (manpower, equipment, weapons, horses, foodstuffs, buildings, 
ships, fortifications, organizational systems etc. etc. utilized for the wars 
of 1793-1815 replicated the range of governmental tasks involved in the 
mobilization of armed force for previous conflicts going back to that 
other protracted period of warfare against Louis XIV and his allies from 
1689-1713. Nevertheless, the length, scale and scope of the effort 
required to raise sufficient funds to acquire the volume of resources 
allocated to defeat Revolutionary and Napoleonic France exceeded by a 
long way anything undertaken by the state since its takeover by William 
of Orange in 1688.  For example, between 1788-92, immediately before 
the Revolutionary War, George III and his ministers allocated about £7 
million per annum to provide for the defence of the realm and civil 
administration (excluding transfer payments for debt servicing). At the 
close of the Napoleonic war (1803-15), expenditures on military and 
naval forces for an expanded empire and an inflated wartime 
administration had multiplied five times in real terms and had gone up 
from around 6% to above 22% of Britain’s national income. 
 
As Table 1 shows the tax “burdens” per head of the population had 
multiplied about seven times compared to amounts appropriated by 
William III to fund his newly acquired kingdom’s re-engagement with 
European power politics during the War of the League of Augsburg 
(1689-97) and by a far larger multiplier if comparisons are made with  
those years of peace under the last Stuart monarch, James II. In short, by 
any historical, international (including Dutch)  standards, the taxation 
carried by British society and the economy to service debt and mobilize 
resources to defeat the ambitions of Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France looks extraordinary.27 
 
 
__________________________ 
27
 The data sources for taxation used here are fully referenced in previous publications. 
P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation 1660-1815,’ in Economic History 
Review, 41 (1988) pp. 1-32 and in P.K. O’Brien and P. Hunt, ‘England,’ in R. Bonney 
(ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200-1815 (Oxford, 1999). The reference 
to Dutch levels is to comparisons made by W. Fritschy, ‘Taxation in Britain, France and 
the Netherlands,’ in Economic and Social History of the Netherlands, 2 (1990) pp. 57-99. 
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Table 1: Burdens of Tax Revenues in Wartime 
 
 
 
War Period 
(5-year average) 
Taxation per Head in 
Constant Prices 
Taxes collected as Shares of 
National Income of GDP 
G 
 GD 
   
1693-97 100 6.7% 
1703-12 158 9.1% 
1743-47 189 8.7% 
1758-62 236 11.5% 
1778-82 277 11.7% 
1812-15 679 18.2% 
 
 
My aim is to say something potentially viable, or at least worth 
contesting about the impact of this particular war upon the long-run 
growth of the economy. Since “loops of inter-connexions” ran both 
ways, let me begin by degrading the hypothesis (prevalent in history 
textbooks) that the structural changes and rapid growth of the economy 
during the years 1793-1815 provided the state with some “substantial” 
share of the extra taxes and ergo the means for servicing debt and 
funding the resources allocated to the navy and to British and foreign 
armies. 
 
Agreed: the rise of new industries, the concentration of production 
in factories, its agglomeration in towns and the increased pressures to 
comply with intensified and more effectively monitored demands for 
taxes in a war against a revolutionary foe, allocated for the defence of 
property and English “freedom” all helped the kingdom’s developed 
fiscal and financial systems to appropriate revenue and borrow money 
more efficiently than ever before. Nevertheless, several quantified 
objections undermine any simplistic view that economic growth and 
structural change provided the state with any significant proportion of 
the extra taxation allocated to service loans and to fund the resources 
required to defeat France. 
 
For example, less than 10% of the incremental taxation allocated to 
wage this war emanated from additions to the volumes of goods, services 
and incomes taxed before its outbreak in 1793. 55% came from raising 
rates of taxation levied on goods, services, wealth and incomes already 
taxed between 1788-92. Taxes introduced in wartime, especially the 
income tax (imposed in 1799), provided the state with the residual 35% of 
12 
 
the additional taxation required to defeat the bid by France for hegemony 
over Europe. Most of these “new taxes” did not, moreover, fall either 
directly or severely upon industries and sectors of the economy 
undergoing the kind of rapid growth, structural change and urban 
agglomeration associated with the First Industrial Revolution. For 
example, cotton textiles, the iron and metallurgical industries, coal, 
internal transportation by canals, shipbuilding and shipping as well as 
exports of manufactured goods continued to enjoy roughly the same kind 
of favourable fiscal treatment long advocated by mercantilists for new 
industries as well as foreign trade and shipping - by then receiving 
heavier protection from the Royal Navy to cope with intensified dangers 
at sea.
28
 
 
Finally, the view that economic growth and structural change 
proceeding more slowly between 1793-1815 could have supplied 
anything more than a fraction of the resources required for warfare looks 
highly implausible because it implies inconceivable rates of expansion for 
the national income and its component fiscal base. Over these years of 
warfare expenditures by the state increased at an annual average rate of 
nearly 5% at a time when the estimated growth rate for gross domestic 
product decelerated to 1.5% per annum.29 
 
Unless the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to changes in 
national income was more than an inconceivable coefficient of 3.3 prima 
facie the data in Table 1 supports the orthodox inference that wars against 
France imposed steep and rising burdens associated with taxation and 
state borrowing on the domestic economy and British society both during 
the conflict and for several decades after final victories at Trafalgar and 
Waterloo.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Taxation for the Wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 
1793-1915,’ in C. Storrs (ed.), The Fiscal Military State in Eighteenth Century Europe 
(Farnham, 2009), pp. 167-201. 
29 N.F.R. Crafts and K. Harley, ‘Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: A  
  Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View,’ in Economic History Review, 45 (`1992) pp. 
703-30 and K. Harley, ‘Reassessing the Industrial Revolution: a Macro View in J. Mokyr 
(ed.), The British Industrial Revolution (Boulder, 1993) pp. 160-205. The debate about 
resources to carry on with the war against France was a dominant discourse of the 
times. See J.E. Cookson, ‘Political Arithmetic and War in Britain,’ in War and Society 
(1983) pp. 37-60. 
30 J.E. Cookson, ‘British Society and the French Wars, 1793-1815,’ in Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, 31 (1985) pp. 74-88 and C. Emsley, British Society and the 
French Wars (Ottawa, 1984). The aftermath of the wars has been well covered by 
historians referenced in footnote 31.
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Nevertheless, the numbers also suggest that the First Industrial 
Revolution continued (vide the indices calibrated by Deane, Cole, Crafts, 
Cuenca-Esteban and others) on an established trajectory. The rate and 
pattern of  industrialization never transformed the national economy or 
extended its fiscal base at a pace anywhere near fast enough to carry 
more than a small share of the costs of this most expensive of conflicts. 
Given that invasion and defeat by the armies of Napoleon could 
conceivably have set back the Industrial Revolution for decades, the 
search for connexions is best conducted by specifying and, if possible, 
marshalling evidence to answer two counterfactual questions that cannot 
be dismissed as anachronistic exercises in theoretical speculation? 
 
Firstly, why did this “re/misallocation” of resources to support 22 
years of warfare fail to depress the growth and structural change of the 
economy even further below levels that might well have been anticipated if 
trends in investment, structural change and of technological innovation 
(discernible during the decade of peace that followed the Treaty of Paris in 
1783) had continued into the 19th century? In other words, why was the 
momentum already transforming the economy from the 1760s onwards not 
held in check for far longer and more seriously by this costly war?31    
 
Secondly (and this is a key argument for reviving an old 
discussion) what, if anything, could be claimed for positive legacies 
and spin-offs from mobilization for war that contributed to recovery 
and placed the economy back onto a course that led to the long 
Victorian boom and to Britain’s interlude of hegemony as the 
commercial hub and industrial workshop of the world?32 
 
 
 
 31 This is virtually the way the question has been posed by England’s most 
distinguished historian of this period. Vide: Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad and Dangerous 
People. England 1783-1846 (New Oxford History of England, Oxford, 2006). Hilton 
provides an excellent survey of the social and political problems of the post war period 
attributable to twenty-two years of engagement in warfare. 
32 As celebrated in recent books by Allen, The British Industrial Revolution; Mokyr, 
Industrial Enlightenment and by P. Vries, State, Economy and the Great Divergence. 
Great Britain and China, 1680s-1850s (Leiden, 2015).
14 
 
 
Fiscal and financial accounts provide the most accessible and  
frequently used bodies of data for historians who attempt to analyse and 
elaborate upon economic costs inflicted by warfare. But they bias 
investigations towards the measurable, neglect real or opportunity costs 
and divert attention away from any serious consideration of material 
benefits that flowed from money efficiently spent by states. Furthermore, 
budgetary accounts are reported in current prices for a period when 
extraordinary fluctuations from year to year renders deflation to real terms 
highly problematical.
33 In short, while official accounts promote 
quantification, historical scholarship could now move on from liberal 
antipathies to unavoidable wars and  concentrate upon the nature, 
significance, transformations and potential benefits as well as the 
opportunity costs of the resources mobilized by Britain and other early 
modern states for warfare.   
 
The resources, reallocated from civilian production, included 
manpower, capital, natural endowments and the skills and funds diverted 
from research and development for more efficient technologies and their 
diffusion across the private sector in order to produce weapons and other 
inputs utilized primarily for warfare. Apart from the long term benefits 
imputable to victory rather than defeat, engagements in warfare carried in 
train positive outcomes for the accumulation of human and social as well 
as physical capital, for the diffusion of technologies for the enhancement 
of a nation’s competitive advantages for trade and commerce overseas 
and, perhaps first and foremost, for the formation of more modern and 
efficient systems for central governance and administration and by 
extension, institutions promoting development.34 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
  33 J.T. Salerno, ‘War and the Money Machine: Concealing the Costs of War Beneath 
the Veil of Inflation,’ in Journal des Economists, 1 (1995), pp. 153-73. For the French wars 
see the classic paper by J. Mokyr and N. Savin, ‘Stagnation in Historical Perspective: 
the Napoleon Wars Revisited,’ in  P. Uselding (ed.), Research in Economic History, 1 
(1976), pp. 198-259. Modern economists who properly prefer to deal with real or 
constant prices should remain aware that indices to measure anything other than grain 
prices were not available to contemporaries at the time. Vide A. Young, An Inquiry into 
the Increases in Prices in Europe during the Past Twenty-five Years (Goldsmiths 
Collection, London, 1815) and T. Tooke, Thoughts and Details on Prices (Goldsmiths 
Collection, London 1824).  
34 In this and other respects the article by G. Hueckel, ‘War and the British Economy, 
1793-1815: a General Equilibrium Analysis,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 10 
(1973) pp. 365-96 promises more than it delivers. For recent analyses, see W. He, 
Paths Toward the Modern Fiscal State. England, Japan and China (Cambridge, Mass, 
2013). 
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4. Labour 
 
The most significant of the factors of production reallocated from 
employment in the private economy either to serve in or, indirectly to 
provide goods and services for the forces of the Crown was manpower. 
According to annual budgetary estimates published for the period 1793-
1815, a modal 60% of the revenues voted by Parliament for the support of 
the armed forces (army, navy, militias, volunteers and ordnance) was 
classified as “pay and provisions”. By the latter years of the Napoleonic 
war, Parliament agreed to pay and feed military, naval and ordnance 
forces in excess of half a million men compared to some 75,000 in 1792.35 
The force under arms, funded by the State, included Irishmen, foreigners, 
volunteers, yeomanry and militias (embodied for only part of a year), as 
well as Indians paid for by the East India Company. Parliamentary “votes” 
can be transformed into “conjectures” that “outerbound estimates for 
incremental shares of “the British” workforce recruited to serve in the 
forces of the crown during the French wars were at most 6% of the 
country’s  labour force and some 11% of males in their prime years.36 My  
calculations make no allowance for troops and sailors recruited from 
Ireland who (according to Fortescue, Glover and Chart) constituted 
“significant” proportions of the British Army and Navy.37   Furthermore, no 
estimates were constructed at the time for the increased numbers of 
workers engaged in maintaining, servicing and building ships, producing 
food, commodities, weapons, equipment, munitions, transportation, 
buildings, shelter etc and the commercial services purchased for the 
 
35 To classify the numbers of men mobilized for full and part-time service in the forces of 
the crown and the sums spent by the state on their pay and food would require years of 
research among several bodies of disparate records for audited public expenditures. The 
imperfect data cited here refer to: budgetary estimates produced for parliament (including 
“extraordinary” expenditures sanctioned after they had been incurred). They were 
published annually in appendices to Journals of the House of Commons and Supply 
Ledgers of the Treasury (Public Record Office Series T/35). They are printed in 
consolidated form in the British Parliamentary Papers 1868-69 (35) and 1858 (17). The 
categories of manpower recruited and paid for military service to the state are discussed 
in C.M. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown (London, 2 vols.1869). 
36 I made a calculation for the census year 1801 designed to provide a quantified upper 
bound notion of the possible shares of the British male workforce reallocated from 
normal civilian employment into production for the navy, army, ordnance, militia, 
volunteers, fencibles etc. After making due allowance for the scale of the pre-war 
armed services and for part-time soldiers and foreign mercenaries, I concluded that 
the extra numbers involved could not have been more than 60% of the totals 
referenced in estimates put before Parliament for budgetary support – a total that 
calibrates into 11% of male workers in their prime years: and around 6% of the 
entire male workforce. 
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army and navy. Thus we might plausibly assume that additional demands 
by the state for “civilian” labour generated by engagement in warfare 
could have been proportional to the shares of the incremental 
expenditures required to enlarge the armies and navies in the pay of the 
Crown between 1793 -1815. On this premise my tentative estimate 
suggests that some 18% of all male British workers in their prime (aged 
15-40) became either directly or indirectly employed in the workforce 
involved with warfare. Conceivably that ratio may overstate the 
opportunity costs incurred for the redeployment of labour because 
Parliament did not pay market wage rates for the kingdom’s soldiers and 
sailors. That parsimony, combined with the operation of  selective and 
coercive systems for conscription (Quota Acts and immpressment) 
encouraged more affluent (“skilled”) men to bribe and purchase their way 
out of military service. 
38  Several histories of mobilization for the armed 
forces are marked by a consensus that both the  Army and the Navy 
(which relied in some, but no small degree, upon coercion to bring ships 
crews and regiments up to strength) recruited, conscripted and impressed 
manpower mainly from the lower ends of pay and skill categories.39 
 
Thus, apart from the merchant marine and shipbuilding industry, the 
civilian economy may not  have been seriously deprived of scarce labour. 
Given that some 60% recruits cited labourer as their occupation, the army  
 
 
 
 
37 J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London, 1910), pp. 94-96; R. Glover, 
Britain at Bay (London, 1973) , p. 131 and R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation. The 
Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 1963) p. 225, and D.A. Chart, 
‘Irish Levies’, in English Historical Review, 26 (1911) pp. 102-32. R. Morriss, The 
Foundations of British Maritime Ascendency, Logistics and the State (Cambridge, 2011);  
R. Knight, Britain Against Napoleon in the Organization of Victory, 1793-1815 (London, 
2013) and S. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters. Administrative Problems in the 
Peninsular War (Oxford, 1957). 
38 J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1997). 
39 The range of measures passed by Parliament during the war to recruit, incentivize, 
cajole and coerce young males to serve in the forces of the crown (army, navy, 
volunteers, militias, fencibles) have been elaborated in detail in books in fns 37 and 38 
Cookson, British and Armed in Nation; C. Emsley, British Society and the French 
Wars, and J. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1965),as 
well as in classical studies by J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army; Fortescue, 
The County Lieutenancies and the Army, 1803-14 (London, 1909); Clode, Military 
Forces of the Crown. Naval recruitment and impressment is covered in books by M. 
Lewis, A Social History of the Navy (London, 1960); C. Lloyd, The British Seaman 1200-
1860 (London, 1968) and N. Rodger, Command of the Ocean. A Naval History of 
Britain, 1649-1815, vol. 2 (London, 2004). 
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could, as Wellington, Malthus and Ricardo suggested, enlisted a significant 
percentage of the nation’s potentially under or unemployed workers.40 
While the coincidence of the wars with upswings in population growth and 
expenditures on poor relief are consistent with suggestions that some kind 
of “military Keynesianism” may have operated over these years. Until the 
closing years wage rates for a majority of workers lagged behind prices.41   
Although pay differentials between skilled and unskilled workers narrowed 
a little in wartime, the evidence for constraints on growth associated with 
inelastic supplies of labour seems neither compelling nor consistent with 
conditions in the labour market for years after the war.42 On the contrary, 
and in so far as Britain entered and remained at war with an elastic supply 
of potentially underemployed labour, remunerated its troops and sailors at 
low rates of pay, and the state maintained repressive controls over all 
forms of collective bargaining by workers, then overall the opportunity 
costs of labour mobilized for warfare might be plausibly depicted as 
relatively insignificant. 43 
 
40 Public Record Office, War Office Papers, volumes 25 and 69 give trades and place of 
birth of recruits to the army; C. Emsley, ‘North Riding Naval Recruits,’ in North 
Yorkshire County Record Office, 18 (1978), pp. 8-13; T.H. McGuffie, ‘Recruiting for the 
Ranks of the Regular British Army,’ in Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research, 34 (1956) pp. 56, 126 and 138. 
41 W.A. Armstrong, ‘The Influence of Demographic Factors on the Position of 
Agricultural Labour in England and Wales, c. 1750-1914,’ in Agricultural History 
Review, 29 (1981), pp. 68-81; Mokyr and Savin, ‘Stagflation in Historical Perspective’, 
reject the full employment assumptions made in two papers by G. Hueckel, ‘The 
Napoleonic Wars and their Impact on Factor Returns and Output Growth in England, 
1793-1815,’ in Economic History Review, 33 (1973) and ‘War and the British 
Economy.’ 
42 The improbable full employment assumption is also the subject of dispute between 
G. Hueckel (cited in fn 41) and J. Anderson, ‘Aspects of the Effect on the British 
Economy of the Wars Against France,’ in Australian Economic History Review, 
12 (1972), pp. 1-18 and ‘A Measure of the Effect of British Public Finance, 1793-1815,’ 
in Economic History Review, 27 (1974), pp. 610-19. Feinstein’s indices for real “earnings 
index adjusted for unemployment” and for full employment show no tendency to rise 
between 1788-92 and 1813-17 – C. Feinstein, ‘Pessimism Perpetuated: Real wages 
and he standard of living in Britain during and after the Industrial Revolution,’ in Journal 
of Economic History, 58 (1998), pp. 648-653. In current prices expenditures on the poor 
in England and Wales rose from just over £2 million per annum in 1783-85 to £6.3 
million in 1814. Data from Parliamentary (Parliamentary Papers 1818 (41) app. 2). The 
numbers are listed as being in receipt of “occasional” and “permanent” poor relief are 
neither concise nor reliable, but they do suggest totals in excess of those on payrolls for 
the armed forces – see K. Williams, From Pauperism to Poverty (London, 1981). 
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Furthermore, the evidence also suggests that the casualties     
suffered by the unfortunate victims of  armed conflict cannot be 
represented as a serious depletion of the stock of human capital available 
for the post-war development of the British economy. Estimates for their 
economic effects are almost impossible to construct because proper 
allowance must be made for normal (civilian) rates for death and injury.44 
While conjectures for “offsets” and externalities including intangible gains 
derived from the inculcation of skills, attitudes to disciplined work and 
bodily health that supposedly came from service aboard naval ships and 
in the colours look plausible. Finally most political and social historians 
with expertise on the period recognize that the response to  French 
aggression by an aristocratic officer class and the upsurge in loyalism 
among the population at large contributed to the stability of Britain’s 
ancien regime as well as to the orderly and deferential behaviour of its 
working class during the difficult years of post-war transition to an 
industrial society.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 This view is congruent with the views of economists of the day including Ricardo and   
Mathus. And see G. Chalmers, Historical View of the Domestic Economy of Britain and 
Ireland (Goldsmiths Collection, London 1812); J. Lowe, The Present State of England 
(Goldsmiths Collection, London, 1822) and T. Tooke, Thoughts and Details on Prices; 
Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815. 
44 On the health of troops, vide E. Charters, Disease, War and the Imperial State 
(Chicargo, 2004); G. Hodge, ‘On the Mortality Arising from Naval Operations,’ in 
Journal of the Statistical Society, 18 (1855) pp. 208-12 and ‘On the Mortality 
Arising from Military Operations,’ in Journal of the Statistical Society, 19 (1856) pp. 
264-66; L.G. White, The Story of Army Education (London, 1963). 
  45 L. Greenfield, The Spirit of Capitalism. Nationalism and Economic Growth (London,   
2001); R. Price, British Society 1680-1880 (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 30-35; Cookson, 
British Armed Nation;  A. Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, 1794-1814 
(Oxford, 2003); H. T. Dickinson, ‘Popular Conservatism and Military Loyalism, 1785- 
1815,’ in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution (Basingstoke, 1989) 
and G. Russell, The Theatres of War. Performance, Politics and Society (Oxford, 
1995).; C. Elmsley, British State and the French Wars – 1792-1815 (London, 1979). 
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To guess at some ratio that might represent net depletion and 
depreciation of the nation’s stock of human and social capital imputable to 
22 years of warfare would be a spurious, not to say a crass form of 
quantification. Given the numbers and credentials of most of the men 
conscripted or reallocated for early modern conflicts, both the short term 
impact of mobilization and longer term economic significance of casualties 
from these final wars against France were probably a lot smaller than they 
were during the world wars of the 20th century.46 There is, moreover, 
nothing in histories of post-war conditions in the labour market to suggest: 
that the economy suffered from inelastic labour supplies between 1793 and 
1815 or that the conflict had seriously depleted on Britain’s stock of human 
capital for the protected engagement in warfare had done anything other 
than strengthen a political and social culture favourable to an established 
order of patriotism and deference to authority.47 That outcome was not  
obtained in France, Spain and other belligerent rivals and competitors on 
the mainland. They suffered far more from casualties than the United 
Kingdom.48 
 
 
5. Connexions of War to the Formation, Depreciation, Destruction, 
Appropriation and Augmentation of the Stock of National Capital 
 
Feinstein estimated that stocks of fixed and circulating capital 
available for private production may have increased by 27% (around 
1.0% per annum) between 1792 and 1816.48a How rapidly that stock might 
have accumulated in the absence of war remains virtually impossible to 
measure.  
 
_________________________________ 
46J. Greenwood, ‘British Loss of Life in the Wars, 1793-1815 and 1914-18,’ in Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, 105 (1942), pp. 4-7; S. Broadberry and P. Howlett, 
‘Economic Mobilization for World War II: The United Kingdom’ (unpublished paper, 
September 1995); S. Broadberry and M. Harrison (eds.), The Economics of World War I 
(Cambridge, 1995). According to Emsley, “French casualties” were much higher. See fn 
45, p. 59. 
47 A.W. Acworth, Financial Reconstruction in England, 1815-22 (London, 1925); B.  
Gordon, Political Economy in Parliament, 1819-23,’ (New York, 1976); B. Gordon, 
Economic Doctrine and Tory Liberalism, 1824-30 (London, 1979); B. Hilton, Corn, 
Cash and Commerce (Oxford, 1977) and A. Gambles, The Boundaries of Political 
Economy. Tory Economic Arguments, 1809-47I (London, 1996); J. Clapham, ‘Europe 
after the Great Wars 1815 and 1920,’ in Economic Journal, 30 (1920), pp. 423-35. 
48 C. Emsley and J. Walvin (eds.), Artisans, Peasant and Proletarians, 1760-1860 
(London, 1985); F. Tallet, War and Society in Early Modern Europe (London, 1992); L. 
James,’ Warrior Race,’ in History of the British at War (London, 2001); A. Burns and J. 
Innes (eds.), Rethinking the Age of Reform (Oxford, 2003). 
48a C. Feinstein, ‘Capital Accumulation in the Industrial Revolution,’ in R. Floud and D. 
McCloskey (eds.), The Economic History of Britain Since 1700, vol.1 (Cambridge, 
1981) pp. 128-42. 
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Yet this potentially major, connexion between the Industrial 
Revolution and the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France has 
stimulated an interesting debate among economic historians, inspired by 
theoretical propositions designed by neo-classical economic theorists, to 
demonstrate that borrowing by states to fund expenditures on their armed 
forces tends (under rigorously specified conditions) to “crowd out” private 
borrowing and investment undertaken for ostensibly more productive 
purposes.49 Thus loans to the state which funded warfare against 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France could have left the kingdom’s 
economy at the end of hostilities with a stock of physical capital depleted 
and depreciated some way below the level that it could counterfactually 
have been in a position to utilize if the state had not borrowed savings to 
sustain much larger armies in the field and navies at sea. Although the 
model looks plausible enough, it remains as a proposition of contention 
among competing theories that span a range of possibilities from crowding 
out to crowding in.50 Thus, the empirical question of where the stock of 
British capital and prospects for its future accumulation might have stood in 
1815 (after some twenty-two years of wartime conditions) continues to be 
complex for historians of British and European economic history to specify, 
let alone measure.51 
 
 
______________________ 
 
 
49 M. Boskin et al (eds.), Private Saving and Public Debt (Oxford, 1987). 
50 B. Friedman, ‘The Effects of Large Government Deficits on Interest Rates and 
Equity Returns,’ in Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1 (1984), pp. 58-71; M. 
Edelstein, ‘What Price Cold War? Military Spending and Private Investment in the US, 
1946-1979,’ in Cambridge Journal of Economics, 14 (1990), pp. 421-37; R. Barro, 
‘Government Spending, Interest Rates, Prices and Budget Deficits in the United 
Kingdom, 1701-1918,’ in Journal of Monetary Economics, 20 (1987), pp. 221-49. J. 
Ventura and H-J. Voth, ‘Debt with Growth. How Sovereign Debt Accelerated the First 
Industrial Revolution’ in National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 
21280 (2015), pp. 1-29. 
51 I rely on data reconstructions by C. Feinstein, ‘Capital Formation in Great Britain,’ 
in P. Mathias and M. Postan (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,, vol. 
VII (Cambridge, 1978), p. 66. Feinstein’s data can be converted to mid-decennial 
estimates for gross national expenditures on capital formations in current prices. They 
are: £10.3 million for 1785, £13.4million for 1790, £16.4million for 1795, £16.9million 
for 1800, £18.9million for 1805, £27.9million for 1810, £37.9million for 1815 and 
£40.7million for 1820. Feinstein’s original data was constructed in constant prices of 
1857-60. 
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Not least because after four years of heavy borrowing (1793-1797) 
Pitt the Younger and his successors at the Treasury departed from the    
kingdom’s traditional strategy by funding very high proportions of the  
resources mobilized to continue the struggle against France with taxes 
instead of loans. Thereafter and by the end of this protracted interval of 
wartime finance 58% of the money raised to secure victory had emanated 
from taxation compared to around 21% for four previous wars.52 Even so, 
the nominal value of the sums borrowed by selling perpetual annuities 
and other public securities on the London capital market do prima facie 
look like an enormous diversion of the nation’s savings away from 
investments for more productive purposes. This impression often arises, 
however, from citations of official figures which refer to the face values of 
the national debt serviced by the state which rose from a nominal total of 
£292 million (1788-92) to £862 million in 1817.53 Apart from impressions 
conveyed by nominal values even when expressed as ratios of national 
income (another modern number unknown to contemporaries) the whole 
problem of “crowding out” could be dismissed as anachronistic and 
malposed because ultimately the funds borrowed by the state were 
allocated to “crowd out” plans for invasion by French armies. A far more 
serious check to economic transformation could have followed from the 
occupation of the United Kingdom by Napoleon’s army. Nevertheless, a 
counterfactual exercise for a First Industrial Revolution, proceeding within 
an improbably peaceable geopolitical international economic order, could 
be heuristic to contemplate with reference to capital formation because 
some degree of avoidable crowding almost certainly occurred, 
particularly in the short run. There are, however, no valid reasons to toy 
with hypotheses that the elasticity of substitution between borrowing by 
the government and investment by the private sector could have been 
close to unity? It is not plausible to suggest that anything close to every 
million pounds subscribed by domestic savers to loans of various 
maturities for the state or extended by suppliers to the army, navy,  
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
52 O’Brien, ‘Taxation for the Wars Against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France’ 
53 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit. The 
Management of Britain’s National Debt, 1756-1815,’ in F.P. Caselli (ed.), Government, 
Debts and Financial Markets in Europe (London, 2008), pp. 179-208. Even though 
market prices were and are quoted for the range of paper assets representing 
government debt, it is not clear what meaning could be attached to a market value for 
the entire stock of any national debt? For even higher estimates see J. McDonald’s A 
Free Nation Deep in Debt (New York, 2003). 
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ordnance and other departments as credit would, ceteris paribus, have 
been invested in assets contributing to the growth and structural 
transformation of Britain’s civilian economy?54 
 
Alas, the data required for a contextualized discussion of probabilities 
based upon macro statistical evidence lacks a secure annual series for 
private investment expenditures upon fixed and circulating capital in 
current prices to compare with the net annual amounts of loans and 
credits extended to the state before, during and in the immediate 
aftermath of warfare from 1793-1815. Feinstein constructed national “best 
guess” totals for such expenditures which are cited in table 2 for purposes 
of comparison with estimates for net inflows of funds (also in current 
prices) obtained by the state from a complex of recorded transactions with 
domestic and foreign capital markets involving the issue, redemption and 
repayment of perpetual, long and short term loans and credits as well as 
transfers for debt servicing. Feinstein warned us, however, that the 
margins of error in his estimates range from 10% to 25%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________ 
54 J.G. Williamson, ‘Why was British Growth so Slow during the Industrial Revolution?’ 
in Journal of Economic History 44 (1987), pp. 687-712 and the subsequent debate in 
C. Heim and P. Mirowski, ‘Interest Rates and Crowding Out during Britain’s Industrial 
Revolution,’ in Journal of Economic History, 47 (1987), pp. 117-39 and J.G. 
Williamson, ‘Debating the British Industrial Revolution,’ in Explorations in Economic 
History, 3 (1987), pp. 269-92. His thesis has now been reformulated by P. Temin and 
H-J. Voth, Prometheus Reshackled. Goldsmith Banks and England’s Financial 
Revolution after 1700 (Oxford, 2012) in ways that both support and undermine the 
crowding out hypothesis.
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Table 2 : Estimates for Borrowing by the State and Conjectures for 
 
Private Expenditures on Capital Formation 1781-1820 (in current prices) 
 
 
 
Annual 
Averages 
£m 
Net Private 
Investment 
£m 
Net State 
Borrowing 
£m 
Nominal 
Yield on 
Consols 
% 
Interest 
Payments on 
Government 
Debt (£m) 
1781-90 10.7 Negligible 4.5 8.8 
1791-1800 22.4 20.2 4.7 10.9 
1801-1810 25.5 13.4 4.8 20.2 
1811-1820 36.7 12.5 4.6 28.3 
 
 
Notes and Sources: Net private investment expenditures are from C. Feinstein, 
‘Capital accumulation and the industrial revolution’, in R. Floud and D. McCloskey 
(eds.) The Economic History of Britain since 1700 (Cambridge, 1981) p. 131. His 
figures have been reflated to current prices using price indices constructed by Rostow 
Gayer and Schwartz in B. Mitchell (ed.) Abstract of Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 
1962), pp. 470-71 and by P.K. O’Brien, ‘Agriculture and the home market for British 
industry 1660-1820’, in English Historical Review, 100 (1985), pp. 773-79. The figures 
for net inflows of money borrowed by the state are taken from P.K. O’Brien’s 
unpublished D.Phil thesis, Government Revenue 1793-1815 (Oxford, 1967). Table 4 p. 
10. Recalculated interest charges on the loans are listed on p. 17 of that thesis. Nominal 
yield on consols is from C. Heim and P. Mirowski, ‘Interest Rates and Crowding out 
during Britain’s Industrial Revolution’, in Journal of Economic History, vol. 
XLVI (1987), p. 120. 
 
 
 
Figures for net annual government borrowing have not been 
reconstructed from the public accounts for the 1780s, but after the 
American war ended in 1782-83,  the net average annual amounts 
borrowed for this particular inter-war period were probably negligible. 
Subsequently net borrowing by the state fluctuated over time and peaked 
in the closing years of the Napoleonic war 1813-15 but then ceased. 
Figures for 1811-20 refer to the years 1811-15 and are an outer-bound 
estimate for a decade when the operations of the sinking fund and 
demobilization from armed conflict led to a switch from net annual 
borrowing to repayments of public debt from 1816-20. 
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Although the table is a mere conjecture for the annual flows of 
savings, private investment, government loans and debt servicing 
operations for the period, it provides some kind of macro- statistical basis 
for addressing the possible significance of crowding out. That hypothesis 
(even if it could be tested econometrically) could not, however, support 
hyperbolic claims that wars could ever be “factored out of the industrial 
revolution”.55 The theory required to address such an unreal separation of 
the kingdom’s industrialization from its engagement in a sequence of 
mercantilist conflicts from 1651 onwards could only be infinitely more 
unreal than an underspecified model for growth that concentrates on 
capital formation alone for the sub-period 1793-1815.56 
 
Yet warfare and its potential for “crowding out” does not prima facie 
look trivial. The sums borrowed by the state represented substantial, and 
in the early stages of the war, high ratios relative to total net investment in 
privately owned stocks of fixed and circulating capital. Nevertheless, other 
data particularly quotations for interest rates (both nominal and real) 
undermine the impression that the annual average sums borrowed by 
government to wage war could be interpreted as a really serious diversion 
 
 
 
55 Even if the model is reformulated to include rational expectations about movements 
in bond prices and interest rates – vide R. Black and C. Gilmore, ‘Crowding Out during 
Britain’s Industrial revolution,’ in Journal of Economic History, 50 (1990), pp. 
109-3. 
56   For the opposite view that this and presumably other wars could with help from 
econometrics be “factored out” see the articles cited in this paper by G. Hueckel and 
by J.G. Williamson, ‘New Views on the Impact of the French Wars on Accumulation 
of Britain,’ in Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper 1480 (1990), 
pp. 1-25. Other cliometricians are not convinced that the supply curve for investible 
funds had been a key constraint on British economic growth or that it remained 
inelastic to changes in the relative price levels, interest rates and to the institutional 
and political changes surrounding the domestic and international markets for capital 
during the French wars. Vide. N.F.C. Crafts, ‘British Economic Growth, 1700-1850. 
Some Difficulties of Interpretation ,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 24 (1987), 
pp. 245-68 and J. Mokyr, ‘Has the Industrial Revolution been Crowded Out? Some 
Reflections on Crafts and Williamson,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 24 
(1989), pp. 293-319. The connexions between warfare and industrialization are 
analysed in P.K. O’Brien, ‘State Formation and the Construction of Institutions for the 
First Industrial Revolution.’ 
25 
 
 
of investible funds available for from capital formation by the private 
sector. Rates of interest referenced above as the nominal yield on 
consols rise by too small a percentage to support such a strong 
hypothesis. Furthermore, these average yields on consols fall into line 
with rates of interest the Treasury had to offer contractors, in order to 
sell perpetual annuities to financial intermediaries operating on the 
London capital market between March 1793 (when the annual interest 
bill for a loan of £4.3 million amounted to 4.29%) and June 1815, when 
net receipts on the final loan of £35 million (to fund armies for the 
Battle of Waterloo) incurred annual interest payments at a rate of 
5.79%. In between the modal rate fluctuated between 4.75% and 
5.75% with peak rates of just over 6% during months of crisis between 
April 1797 and April 1798.57 This data, together with a reading of day-
to-day records of governmental transactions with the money market 
could not rule out some degree of crowding out or dismiss theoretically 
plausible connexions between public and private operations, that 
occurred in the context of an integrating but hardly an integrated 
national market for capital.58 But they do suggest that the more 
interesting question for historians to address is, as usual, the issue 
debated by contemporaries at the time; namely why flows of funds 
made available for purposes of warfare as well as the continued 
formation of capital in agriculture, industry, commerce and the 
infrastructure, remained relatively elastic during a quarter of a century 
of discernibly elevated levels of demand for loans and credits by 
 
 
 
 
57 P.K. O’Brien, Government revenue, p. 17. These rates are ratios in current prices for 
the amounts received at the Exchequer and annual interest payments incurred to raise 
loans. The late John Wright of Trinity College, Oxford, clarified the meanings that could 
be attached to total returns on the range of government stocks traded on the London 
capital market in an unpublished paper, ‘Government Borrowing and the Interest Rate 
1750-1815’ (unpublished paper, Oxford, July, 1996). 
58 J.L. Buchinsky and B. Polak, ‘The Emergence of a National Capital Market in 
England,’ in Journal of Economic History, 53 (1993), pp. 1-24, and Temin and Voth, 
Prometheus Reshackled.
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the British and also by other European states engaged in warfare?59 This 
question also bears upon the wider problem of the relative significance of 
constraints arising from propensities and capacities to save compared to 
propensities and opportunities to invest during the Industrial Revolution.60 
 
Although the majority of the physical indicators for investment for 
the years immediately before and during the war testify to something like 
a semblance of continuity in capital formation between 1793 and 1815, 
the  financial flow charts required to deal with the problem of domestic 
savings supplemented by inflows of foreign funds and expenditures on 
capital formation between 1793 and 1815 might never be constructed.61 
 
Several more or less plausible reasons can be offered to account 
for the wartime paradox. For example, the spread and persistence of 
warfare across the mainland of Europe widened and deepened the 
transnational pool of investible funds (credits and loans) that became  
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 In real terms the net amounts borrowed fell from around £18 million per annum, 
1793-97 to £8 million, 1808-12, but were jacked up to £14 million for the final years of 
the Napoleonic War 1813-15 (see O’Brien, Government Revenue, tables 18-22). The 
contemporary debate is surveyed by Cookson, ‘Political Arithmetic and War in Britain,’ 
and vide P. Colquhoun , ‘Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British 
Empire,’ (Goldsmiths Collection, University of London Library) and G. Chalmers, ‘An 
Estimate of the Comparative Strength of Great Britain, 1804,’ (Goldsmiths Collection, 
University of London Library) for views by contemporary economists that the economy 
could sustain warfare and growth at the same time. 
60 A question that has preoccupied Crafts (Crafts, ‘British Economic Growth, 1700- 
1850) and R.C. Allen, ‘Engels Pause. Technological Change. Capital Accumulation, 
Technological Change and the Distribution of Income during the Industrial 
Revolution,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 46 (2009), pp. 418-35.  
61 Physical and surrogate indicators for capital formation in print refer to: the production 
of bricks, white glass, pig iron, steam engines, ships, copper, tin, iron; factories erected 
for woollens and  paper, imports of timber, bills passed for enclosures of land, river 
improvements, canal and road construction, houses charged to the window tax, numbers 
of banks, cotton spindles in operation, patents registered etc are tabulated in O’Brien, 
Government Revenue, table 36; A. Gayer et al, Growth and Fluctuations in the 
British Economy, 2 vols (Oxford, 1953) and S. Pollard and J.P. Higgins (eds.), Aspects 
of Capital Investment in Britain (London, 1971). 
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accessible to the British government.62 In contrast to all other European 
states - and except perhaps momentarily in 1797 and 1805 – neither 
domestic nor foreign investors in the securities of the Island state could 
have rationally contemplated that the realm might be successfully invaded 
from the sea; or that the government’s debt (with its traditionally secure 
and untaxed payments of interest) might be repudiated either as an 
outcome of conquest or as the result of any unmanageable fiscal and 
financial crisis of the state. Over 22 years of prolonged and widespread 
revolutionary warfare (when the external security and internal stability of 
almost all other European empires, realms and republics either 
experienced or anticipated threats from French aggression and when 
property rights of all kinds became extremely difficult for states to protect) 
the safest haven for mobile capital was located offshore. 
 
 
References to the flight of liquid capital (along with people with 
commercial expertise) to Britain are not difficult to cite. 63 Bonds and bills 
issued as securities by the Government, or firms, in London surely 
continued to provide European investors with marketable and less risky  
 assets for their portfolios than anything available elsewhere. 
 
  
   62  G.J. Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire (London 1991); R.J. Black, ‘Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Warfare,’ in R. J. Black (ed.), European Warfare, 1453-1815 (Basingstoke, 
1999); K.J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and the International Order 
(Cambridge, 1991). E. Aerts and F. Crouzet (eds.), Economic Effects of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. (Proceedings of the Tenth International Economic 
History Congress, Leuven, 1990). 
63 This view has been developed by Neal in a seminal book on the international capital 
market and a series of articles on capital movements during the French war. His views  
align with the perceptions of contemporary observers. Vide: L. Neal, The Rise of 
Financial capitalism (Cambridge, 1990); L. Neal, ‘A Tale of Two Revolutions, 
International 
Capital Flows, 1789-1819.’ In Bulletin of Economic Research, 43 (1991), pp. 307-37. 
Neal’s views are shared by Acworth, Financial Reconstruction in England. While Lord 
Grenville told Auckland : “the proposal of confiscating foreign property in the funds I hold 
in abhorrence”, Dropmore Papers 1892-1915, vol. 8, letter dated 2 December 1806. On 
the migration of European merchants into London, vide S. Chapman, Merchant 
Enterprise in Britain from the Industrial Revolution to World War 1 (Cambridge, 1992) and 
P. Gauci, Expansion of the World. The Merchants of London, 1660-1800 (Oxford, 2006). 
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Alas, data for flows of capital emanating not only from the mainland but 
from the United States; from Britain’s expanding empire and conquests in 
the Caribbean, India, South East Asia and the collapsing empires of 
Portugal and Spain in South America cannot be aggregated into an 
unambiguous and incontestable table of annual estimates of transfers of 
foreign and imperial funds into and out of London during the wars. 
Cuenca’s recently and constructed balance of payments accounts, 
Feinstein’s estimates and Wright’s research into overseas holdings in the 
national debt add up to an impression of potentially significant net inflows 
of savings from overseas.64 
 
Given that international markets for mobile capital had been 
integrating  for several decades before the outbreak of revolution in 
France and the strong historical evidence that during these wars London 
became Europe’s most secure haven for capital and skills, the 
presumption that capital flight from the mainland helped (in some and 
perhaps significant measure)  at least mitigated the more adverse 
effects from crowding out remains plausible. After all, the French 
Revolution, particularly in its initial phases, represented a serious attack 
upon aristocratic and other forms of ancien regime, wealth and property 
rights.65 Revolutionary and Napoleonic armies threatened and/or actively 
disrupted the operations of capital markets in Amsterdam, Antwerp, 
Venice, Hamburg, Frankfurt and other European cities that before the 
Revolution had rivalled London as centres for dealings in financial 
assets.66 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Cuenca-Esterban’s research which has superseded the controversial estimates from 
Brezis is cited at fn.152. Feinstein’s data is in P. Mathias and M. Postan (eds.), 
Cambridge Economic History of Europe , vol. 7, p. 66 and Wright’s unpublished 
research is cited in fn. 57 and by J. Wright, ‘The Contribution of Overseas Savings to 
the Funded National Debt of Great Britain,’ in Economic History Review, 50 (1999) pp. 
657-74. 
65   F. Crouzet, Britain Ascendant: Comparative Studies in Franco-British History 
(Cambridge, 1990) and D. Bell, The First Total War. Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of 
Modern Warfare (London, 2007). 
66  Aerts and Crouzet (eds.), Economic Effects of the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars; P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Hanoverian State and the Defeat of the 
Continental System,’ in R. Findlay et al (eds.), Eli Heckscher, International Trade and 
Economic History (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 373-406; A. Milward and S.B. Saul, 
The Economic Development of Continental Europe, 1780-1870 (London,1973), pp. 248-
70; S. Schama, ‘The Exigencies of War and Politics of taxation in the Netherlands,’ in 
J.M. Winter (ed.), War and Economic Development (Cambridge,1975), pp. 103-38; 
Harvey, Collision of Empires; C. Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars 1803-15. An International 
History (London, 2007).
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At the same time positive if unintended offsets flowed from Pitt’s 
famous decision of 1797 to release the country’s monetary system from 
all constraints of convertibility associated with an 18th century version of 
the gold standard. 67 Assisted by the greater flexibility introduced into the 
supply of paper money and credit, the kingdom’s financial intermediaries 
(merchants, metropolitan banks, insurance firms, mortgage companies, a 
reformed stock exchange and literally hundreds of newly founded 
provincial banks) extended their services and accessibility to include a 
range of hitherto riskier customers and securities for credits and loans as 
well as a wider array of assets which were, moreover, cushioned at the 
safer end of their portfolios by the bonds and bills of the Government 
bearing rates of interest some 30%-40% above normal pre-war levels and 
predicted to appreciate in value once victory was secured.68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 7The 18th century monetary system is described in classic texts by J. Clapham, 
History of the Bank of England, vol.1 (Cambridge, 1948); T.S. Ashton and R. Sayers 
(eds.), Papers in English Monetary History (Oxford, 1953) and L.S. Pressnell, Country 
Banking in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1956). M. Collins, Money and Banking in 
the United Kingdom updates those texts. The classic article on monetary regulation is 
by M.C. Lovell, ‘The Role of the Bank of England as a Lender of Last Resort in the 
Crises of the Eighteenth Century’, in Explorations in Economic History, 10 (1957), pp. 
8-21.  
68 The operations of the financial and monetary system under a regime of inconvertible 
paper, 1797-1819 has been covered by a prolonged and voluminous contemporary 
debate surveyed by E. Wood, Theories of Central Bank Control (Cambridge, Mass., 
1939); J. Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (London, 1955) and F.W. 
Fetter, The Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 
There is also an extensive modern literature in British monetary history the most recent 
publications with bibliographies are M. Bordo and F. Capie (eds.), Monetary Regime in 
Transition (Cambridge, 1994), and my working paper, P.O’Brien and N. Palma, ‘Danger 
to the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street. The Bank Restriction Act and the Regime Shift 
to Paper Money,’ in EHES Working Papers, Economic History, 100 (2016). 
 
 
From 1797 to 1819 the flexibility afforded by the suspension of 
specie payments to transact with paper money, bank deposits and bills of 
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exchange, as well as with the government’s own bills, promoted the 
extension and integration of the market for money, stimulated financial 
intermediaries to take greater risks and encouraged those with liquid 
savings to invest, not only in government paper, but to participate in what 
moralists, conservatives and monetarists of the day condemned as 
“speculation”.69   Of course, the dangers of a monetary system freed from 
regulations of any kind, reliant upon the discretion of ministers of the 
crown, the caution of governors of the Bank of England and the prudence 
of bankers free to issue their own paper notes and credit were cogently 
articulated at the time.70 During the famous bullion controversy of 1810- 
11, Ricardo and his supporters castigated ministers (trying to run a war to 
British exports). In their view they had allowed a fragile paper pound to 
depreciate against gold and other hard currencies to the tune of 10%-
15%.71   By that stage of the war, with inflation running at 3%, inconvertible 
paper money had indeed begun to display familiar dangers in the form of 
higher interest rates charged for loans and credits extended to the state 
and shortages of funds for fixed investments in houses, buildings, social 
overhead capital and mortgages for agricultural improvements.72 
Nevertheless, the hopes of Napoleon and his advisers for a collapse of the 
British fiscal and financial system and the dire predictions of English  
bullionists never came to pass.73 At the height of French domination over  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Merchants and Bankers as Patriots or Speculators. Foreign Commerce 
and Monetary Policy in Wartime, 1793-1815,’ in J. McCusker and K. Morgan (eds.), The 
Early Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, 2000); R. Cameron et al (ed.), Banking in the Early 
Stages of Industrialization (Oxford, 1967), chapters 1-3; L. Brunt, ‘Country banks as 
venture capitalists,’ in Journal of Economic History, 1 (2001), pp. 74-102. 
70 E. Cannan (ed.), The Paper Pound 1797-1821 (London, 1925) and F.W. Fetter, ‘The 
Politics of the Bullion report, ‘in Economica, 26 (1959), pp. 99-120. 
   71 J. Silberling, ‘Financial and Monetary Policy in the Wars Against France,’ in Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 38 (1924), pp. 214-33. 
72 Mokyr and Savin , ‘Stagflatation in Historical Perspective.’ 
73 F. Crouzet, L’Economie britannique et le blocus continental, Harvey, Collision of 
Empires and D. Bell, The First Total War. Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Modern 
Warfare (London, 2007); J. Gent, ‘The Sustainability of Britain’s Public Debt in the 
Period 1765-1850,’ (unpublished Master’s thesis, Department of Economic History, LSE, 
2015-16). 
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Europe, despite inflation, a depreciated rate of exchange,and Napoleon’s 
serious attempt to blockade European markets, the Hanoverian state 
continued to borrow at rates of interest below 5%. By then (1812-15) wages 
were probably beginning to catch up with prices. For most of the war that 
involuntary transfer of income from labour to capital operated to stimulate 
savings and to cheapen construction and all other labour intensive forms of 
capital formation.74 
 
In theory a floating pound detached from gold might have checked 
the flight of capital from Napoleon’s extensive empire into London. But 
sterling was by no means the only currency to fluctuate in value when 
French armies rampaged across Europe.75 Meanwhile fluctuating rates 
probably encouraged foreign investors to retain sterling assets until the 
pound stabilized and the government kept to its repeated promise to 
continue to run a sinking fund and to return the monetary system to full 
convertibility at the traditional parity with gold.76 
 
Thirdly, over the years of conflict interest payments to service the 
mounting burden of debt (see Table 2) rose from about half the annual net 
amounts borrowed by the state to prosecute war against Revolutionary 
France (1793-1802) to reach about double the sums raised as loans in 
order to vanquish the Napoleonic empire between 1803-15. This  
“regressive” political mechanism for transferring income from taxpayers to 
creditors (or from social groups with lower capacities to save and invest to 
those with higher propensities) had evolved steadily, war by war, since the 
Dutch coup d’état of 1688.77 It augmented a trend towards increased 
inequality and contributed to social distress and internal disorder for some  
 
  74 Runs of bad harvests, inflation and swings relative prices renders the task of 
constructing a representative trend for rates of change in real wages during a period    
of  war very difficult. Vide N. Von Tunzelman, ‘Trends in Real Wages Revisited. 1750- 
1850,’ in Economic History Review, 32 (1979), pp. 33-49. Feinstein’s widely accepted 
indices in ‘Pessimism Reunited,’ suggests that real earnings adjusted for 
unemployment     did not regain 1788-92 levels before 1818-22. Crouzet surveys the 
data and plumps for a disaggregated representation. Vide F. Crouzet, ‘Guerre et 
Salaires de L’Angleterre 1793,’ in F. Crouzet (ed.), Melange d’histoire economique 
offerrs au Professeur Anne    Marie Kinz (Geneve, 1989), pp. 71-85. 
75 Young, An Inquiry into the Increase in Prices in Europe; Neal’s point ‘Tale of Two 
Revolutions,’ that a potentially large share of European capital flowing into London 
went into shipping and commercial, services allied to trade and enjoyed protection from 
the Royal Navy, is supported by histories of London merchants. Vide the bibliography 
in K. Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy (Cambridge, 2000); 
Chapman, Merchant Enterprise; Liss, Atlantic Empires and Gauci, London 
Merchants. 
76 O. Brien, ‘Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power with Profit,’ and Gent, ‘The 
Sustainability of Britain’s Public Debt in the Period, 1765-1850,’ Department of 
Economic History Masters Thesis in 2011 (L.S.E.). 
77 O’Brien, ‘The Political Economy of British Taxation’ and MacDonald, A Free Nation 
Deep in Debt.  
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three decades in the wake of the final victory at Waterloo.78 While the 
wars against France continued the reinvestment mechanism built into the 
Hanoverian states fiscal and financial system and maintained an elastic 
supply of loans and credits for a state engaged in warfare to protect the 
political privileges and rights of property, including the assets of 
bondholders - who could confidently anticipate a significant uplift in the 
value of their securities once the end of any war terminated the need to 
run budgetary deficits and when the operations of Pitt’s constitutionally 
safeguarded sinking fund would resume operations designed to redeem 
the entire public debt.79 
To sum up: some crowding out inevitably occurred during this most 
protracted and costly of mercantilist wars, but several factors operated to 
weaken its potentially serious obstruction to Britain’s trajectory towards an 
industrial economy. Firstly, Pitt’s suspension of convertibility created 
conditions of flexibility for an unusual increase in the money supply that 
allowed for the widening, deepening and integration of financial 
intermediation without running into any really serious danger of fiscal and 
financial collapse while promoting a lag of wages behind rising prices. 
Secondly, the nature and extent of warfare on the mainland, initiated and 
sustained by France, together with the loot from extensions to the formal  
 
 
78 P. Hoffman, et al, ‘Real Inequality in Western Europe since 1500,’ in Journal of 
Economic History, 62 (2002), pp. 322-55.N. Gash, ‘After Waterloo: British Society and 
the Legacy of the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 28 
(1978), pp. 145-57; M. C. Buer, ‘Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic Wars,’ in 
Economica, 2 (1921), pp. 159-79 and Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce and other 
books cited in fn 47. 
79 O’Brien, ‘Mercantilist Institutions for the Pursuit of Power and Profit’; Wright, 
‘Government Borrowing and Interest Rate’. J.G. Williamson, Did British Capitalism Breed 
Inequality? (London, 1985). Ch. 4 surveys and calibrates the rather restricted evidence 
available from tax data and contemporary estimates to address this issue; Pitt funded 
the massive deficit for 1797 with what he termed a “loyalty loan” and published the 
names of patriots who contributed. On the fear of Revolution in England, vide: 
Dickinson, Britain and the French revolution; Gee, The British Volunteer Movement, and 
Hilton, A Bad and Dangerous People; Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century. 
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and informal British empire overseas and the collapse of Iberian 
empires, promoted movements of foreign capital into London. 
Thirdly, the bias already built  into the states’ fiscal and financial 
system (together with inconvertible paper money) intensified 
tendencies towards inequality in the distribution of income that 
promoted propensities to save and invest among a propertied and 
patriotic elite, whose political and economic stake in the kingdom 
was under threat from the armies of Revolutionary France.80 
 
Finally, and to complete a specimen balance sheet on capital 
account, it will be necessary to analyse and quantify not merely the 
incalculable costs of averting invasion, but an offsetting list of long 
term gains derived from some 22 years of higher expenditures by 
the state on warfare that augmented the stock of public and social 
capital available to contribute to the recovery and longer run growth 
of the British economy after 1815.
81
 
 
Thus, some of the surplus capital owned by the forces of the crown 
in 1815 (including ships, buildings, wagons, horses, stores etc) was 
resold at bargain prices for civilian use at the end of the conflict. For 
several decades after final victory at Waterloo the state commanded 
a range of warships, weapons and skills held in reserve for the defence of 
the realm and its extended empire, to support the kingdom’s foreign, 
strategic and commercial policies and an enlarged army of troops with 
equipment and barracks for the maintenance of internal order.82   Lord  
 
 
 
 
80 This argument was elaborated by a long list of political arithmeticians whose writings 
and numbers on post-war wealth, power and resources of Britain and its extended 
empire can be consulted in the Goldsmiths Collection at the Library of the University of 
London. Under the names of G. Chalmers, P. Colquhoun, J. Lowe, J. Marshall, C. 
Moreau, T. Vaux. These writings neglected by economic historians in thrall to classical 
economics have been surveyed and contextualized by historians including: Acworth, 
Financial Reconstruction; Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce; Gambles, The Boundaries 
of Political Economy; Hilton, England 1783-1860.  
 81 Stocks of military and naval capital are reviewed in the House of Commons Journal      
(1806), pp. 781-86 and Parliamentary Paper 1817 (4). For the navy see J. Coad, The 
Royal Dockyards, 1690-1850 (Aldershot, 1989); R. Morriss, The Foundations of British 
Maritime Supremacy. Resources, Logistics and the State, 1755-1815 (Cambridge, 
2011). 
82 Acworth, Financial Reconstruction; Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce; S. Pollard 
and D.W. Crossley, The Wealth of Britain, ch. 6; S. Checkland, The Rise of Industrial 
Society in England, 1815-1885 (New York, 1964). 
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Liverpool’s and subsequent administrations controlled an intimidating 
fleet of battleships; a trained supply of skilled seamen and soldiers; 
reserves of cannon, muskets, pistols, swords, bayonets, modernized 
royal dockyards, new barracks, hospitals, coastal fortifications, military 
roads, organizational systems, etc. In short the realm’s military and 
naval infrastructure had been significantly increased by wartime 
expenditures, by expropriations (principally ships and a small 
indemnity) from France) and by some technological innovations. 
Twenty-two years of investment in the manpower, equipment, capital 
and ideology required for warfare, allowed Britain’s victorious and 
hegemonic state not merely to demobilize most of its armed forces, but 
to radically reduce future expenditures on the means required by the 
army and navy to defend the realm as well as its extended commerce 
and empire overseas while maintaining order over several difficult 
decades of industrialization and urbanization after the treaty of Vienna 
had stabilized the balance of power in Europe. 83 
 
Factoring in the benefits as well as the costs of  that unavoidable 
investment is difficult enough to specify and model. Meanwhile, 
prospects for striking anything other than a conjectural balance sheet 
or factoring armed conflicts out of analytical narratives, or the industrial 
revolution are too remote to contemplate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
83 F. Crouzet, A History of the European Economy (London, 2001); F. Crouzet, ‘The 
Second Hundred Years War: Some Reflections,’ in French History, 10 (1996) pp. 
432-50 and Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics; Ruttan, Is War 
Necessary for Economic Growth?; V. Hanson, Why the West has War, Carnage and 
Culture (London, 2002); L. James, Warrior Race. A History of the British at War 
(London, 2001); C. Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars (Manchester, 
1992); R. Morriss, The Foundation of British Maritime Supremacy.
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6. Warfare and the Intensified Exploitation of the Island’s 
Cultivatable Land, Minerals, Industries and Technologies  
 
 Once at war British statesmen sought to augment and exploit the 
potential of the Island’s natural resources and national system of 
production to the full. 84   As mercantilists appreciated the need to minimize 
the inefficiencies associated with taxation, to contain wasteful expenditures 
on the army and navy, to minimize the crowding out of private investment 
and to reduce dependence on imports, and thereby reserve hard currency 
for such strategic priorities as payments to allied, mercenary and British 
troops committed to conflict on the mainland of Europe and for payments to 
provision, refit and repair naval warships docked in ports overseas.85 
 
Not surprisingly warfare depressed the kingdom’s rate of growth 
and pushed its economy off a course of recovery it had been on during the 
decade between the end of the war with the United States and its allies 
(1783) and the opening of the long conflict with Revolutionary France some 
ten years later. Unfortunately the macro- economic data for the analysis of 
trends and fluctuations from 1783-1821 (when the monetary system 
returned to full conventibility and taxation reverted to peace time levels) is 
neither extensive in range, adequate in quality nor sufficiently complete in 
chronological coverage to provide acceptable records to analyse and 
quantify the overall performance of agriculture, industry and foreign trade 
for a period of somewhere close to three decades when the kingdom’s 
economy operated under conditions of warfare, and its aftermath. 
________________________ 
84 The political economy of power and warfare is analysed by the predecessors (not the 
precursors) of Adam Smith, vide: T.W. Hutchinson, The Emergence of Political Economy 
(Oxford, 1988). Mercantilist views on the strategic necessities for conserving bullion as a 
“war chest” are covered in Magnusson (ed.), Mercantilist Economics; C. Perrota, ‘Is the 
Mercantilist Theory of the Favourable Balance of Trade Really Erroneous?’ in History of 
Political Economy, 23 (1991), pp. 302-55 and R.C. Blitz, ‘Mercantilist Policies and the 
Pattern of World Trade ,’ in Journal of Economic History,27 (1967) pp. 39-55. 
85 They are articulated in all the statesman’s papers for the period deposited in the 
British Libraries Collection of Additional Manuscripts. See the papers of Auckland, 
Herries, Liverpool, Rose, Vansittart and Wellington, as well as the Pitt Papers at the 
Public Record Office and debates in Parliament. M. Sherwig’s Guineas and 
Gunpowder. British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1969) elaborates on the role of wartime  transfers of bullion to allies and 
mercenaries. Policies and reforms to contain the waste and corruption associated with 
expenditures of the Army and Navy are analysed by the scholarship of R. Morriss, The 
Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy; and R. Knight, Britain Against Napoleon. 
The Organization of Victory;  C. Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the 
Eighteenth Century (London, 2004).  
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Several indices used to measure the long term growth of the 
national product, agricultural and industrial outputs, average wages and 
prices remain in dispute. More serious, for attempts to quantify the 
immediate impact of war are published figures based upon interpolations 
between benchmark years which are too widely separated in time to 
expose fluctuation in outputs, incomes and prices imputable to both 
negative and positive influences from engagement in this conflict. For 
purposes of this survey, I will consider both quantitative and qualitative 
sources (published and unpublished) for agriculture, industry and 
international commerce in an attempt to offer some plausible conjectures 
about the significance of a protracted interlude of warfare for the growth 
of an economy passing through a First Industrial Revolution. 86 
 
Between 1793 and 1815 the expansion of domestic (including 
Irish) agriculture already underway accelerated into a long cycle of 
structural change that continued down to mid-century.87  The kingdom’s 
agrarian sector played an important role in mobilizing provisions and 
organic raw materials for the forces of the crown. Along with previous 
conflicts the French wars remained labour and food intensive. Budgetary 
estimates indicate that very high proportions of the revenues allocated by 
Parliament for the Army and Navy were for the pay and provisions of 
British soldiers and sailors.88 It is, however, impossible to measure the  
 
 
86 Clark offers a comprehensive range of indices. G. Clark, ‘The Macro-Economic       
Aggregates for England 1209-2008’ in Research in Economic History, 27 (2010), pp. 
96-136. The most recently published set of annual data is S. Broadberry et al., British 
Economic Growth 1270-1870 (Cambridge, 2015). Their data remains under review. 
87 A range of growth rates for agriculture are reported by R.C. Allen, ‘Tracking the  
Agricultural Revolution in England,’ in Economic History review, 52 (1990), pp. 209-35 
and his contribution, R.C. Allen, ‘Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution,’ to R.F. 
Floud and P. Johnson eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, 1700-60 
(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 96-116. The standard text on the agricultural revolution is M. 
Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England. The Transformation of the Agrarian 
Economy, 1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1996). A good thesis on the stimulus imparted by 
the war to Irish agriculture is by A.J. Fitzpatrick, The Economic Effects of Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars on Ireland (Manchester PhD, 1973). 
88 The allocation of funds raised to prosecute warfare across sectors of the economy 
are recorded in multiple ways by the several departments of state (the Admiralty and 
Navy Board, the War Office and Board of Transport, the Transport Office, the Board for 
Barracks etc and at Regimental levels). These records make it virtually impossible for 
modern historians to aggregate data that would provide valid tabulations of wartime 
expenditures for purposes of economic analysis. Commissions and Committees of 
Enquiry established for purposes of auditing military and naval expenditure also found 
the tasks of post hoc audit too complex to comprehend and control. (Vide the Reports 
of Committees and Commissioners appointed to “Examine, Take and State the Public 
Accounts of the Kingdom”, 1780-91 volumes II and 12 and 13, Journals of the House  
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net effect on agriculture because fiscal data suggests that the incidence 
of the incremental taxes imposed to fund the wars of 1793-1815 may 
have fallen  with  particular severity (both directly and indirectly) upon the 
production of foodstuffs and raw materials and upon the incomes and 
wealth of farmers and landowners.89 
 
Fortuitously but fortunately ministers (seeking to secure compliance 
with their increasing demands for taxation and requests for loans from the 
United Kingdom’s affluent groups of aristocratic landowners and tenant 
farmers the agricultural sector contained both a sufficient area of under-
utilized but cultivable land and growing supplies of under- employed labour 
available to respond  elastically to rapidly rising demands for food and 
organic raw materials.  These demands emanated basically from the 
acceleration in population growth and internal migration to towns, but were 
supplemented by “incremental purchases” by the state for provisions, 
fibres, horses, leather, timber and building materials to support the 
mobilization of young men for service in the army, navy, ordnance, and 
militia.90 
 
Contemporary reports from the Farmers and Monthly Magazines and 
Arthur Young’s Annals of Agriculture as well as the testimonies of 
numerous farmers, landowners, agents and others with professional 
knowledge - who appeared before Parliamentary committees investigating 
the state of the agrarian economy as it adjusted to post war deflation, 
demobilization and the persistence of high taxation - have left a very 
considerable body of evidence that testifies to the incidence of warfare on 
the kingdom’s agricultural sector.  This library of localized description and 
ad hoc statistics surveyed and analysed by generations of agrarian 
historians describes how effectively British and Irish landowners and 
farmers responded to incentives to profit from the circumstances 
_____________ 
of Commons, volumes 38-42 and Parliamentary Papers 1790-91 (92). Parliament 
continued to attempt to take control of expenditures of the armed forces during and after 
the wars with France. Vide: reports from Commissioners of Naval and Military Inquiry in 
Parliamentary Papers, Parliamentary Papers 1805 (2), 1810 (2), 1810-11 (4), 1812 (4), 
1817 (4) and Committees on Finance in Journals of the House of Commons, volumes 
41, 42. Reporting and auditing problems have been studied by J.E.D. Binney, British 
Public Finance and Administration (Oxford, 1958). I attempt to reclassify a sample of 
budgetary estimates laid before Parliament during war. They “suggest”  that something 
like 70-75% of expenditures on the armed forces were allocated to foodstuffs and 
organic raw materials produced by the kingdom’s agricultural sector. Vide estimates 
published annually in the Journals of the House of Commons, fn. 35. 
89   O’Brien, ‘Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State,’ pp. 86-200. 
90 R. Morriss, The Foundations of British Maritime Supremacy; Knight, Britain Against 
Napoleon; R. Knight and M. Wilcox, Sustaining the Fleet, 1793-1815 (London, 2010). 
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and conditions created by wars with Revolutionary France. Thereafter the 
sector confronted the challenges of the immediate post-war decades that 
required adjustment to: falling prices for primary products and the 
resumption of imports from the mainland, along with intensified 
competition from the integration of Ireland into the British economy as well 
as the persistence of higher taxes to service a Government debt that had 
reached the extraordinary level of some 2.5 times the national income, for 
an enlarged and extended military and naval establishment and elevated 
levels for welfare expenditures on the rural poor.
91
 
 
Attempts in recent years to quantify this tradition of dense narrative 
histories of agrarian development that accompanied and sustained the 
kingdom’s transition to an urban industrial economy with the theoretically 
required range of statistical indicators are still underway and remain as 
another area of dispute about “facts”.
92 The indices currently in print for 
 
 
91 The best known observers of the realm’s agrarian economy as it developed from 
1783-1846 are Arthur Young and John Sinclair. An enormous range of contemporary 
comment (with data) is contained in the publications of the Goldsmiths Collection of 
Economic Literature at the University of London Library. Year by year reports on the 
state of agriculture, county by county, are reported in the Monthly, Gentlemen’s and 
Farmers magazines and the Annals of Agriculture. The testimonies and data of 
landowners, farmers and managers of estates who appeared before Parliamentary 
Committees can be read in reports from Committees of the House of Commons, 
volumes 9 (1798), 1800 1801, and in Parliamentary Papers 1806-07 (2), 1808 (2), 
1809 (2), 1813-14 (4), 1813-14 (5), 1819 (3), 1821 (9), 1836 (8). The last three 
Parliamentary Papers contain reports with minutes of evidence related to agricultural 
distress in the wake of war.  
92 The modern bibliography is extensive and referenced in texts by Overton, 
Agricultural Revolution; E.L. Jones, Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 
1974) and includes several seminal articles focussed on agriculture during and in the 
aftermath of war by: M.C. Burr, ‘Trade Depression Following the Napoleonic War,’ in 
Economica, 2 (1921), pp. 159-79; N. Gash, ‘Rural Unemployment, 1815-34,’ in Economic 
History Review, 6 (1935), pp. 90-93 and ‘After Waterloo: British Society and the Legacy 
of the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 28 (1978) pp. 
145-57; E.L. Jones, ‘The Agricultural Labour Market in England, 1793-1872,’ in 
Economic History Review, 17 (1964), pp. 322-38; A.H. John, ‘Farming in Wartime, 1793-
1815,’ pp. 28-47; G. Hueckel, ‘The Napoleonic Wars, Output Growth in England, 1793-
1815,’ in Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973), pp. 309-29, and ‘English Farming, 
Profits during the Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,’ and ‘Relative Prices and Supply 
Response in English Agriculture during the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Economic History 
Review, 29 (1976) pp. 401-14; S. McDonald, ‘Agricultural Response to a Changing 
Market during the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Economic History Review, 33 (1980), pp. 59-71; 
A.R. Wilkes, ‘Readjustments in Arable Farming after the Napoleonic Wars,’ in 
Agricultural History Review, 28 (1982), pp. 96-103. 
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long term annual rates of growth for agricultural output, investment, 
profits, rents, wages and for trends in yields, labour and total factor 
productivities are not founded upon any standardized and accepted body 
of official data. Statistics for total production have not been constructed 
on the same basis and are not tabulated to refer to comparable 
chronologies. In short, contention over the statistics available for histories 
of the kingdom’s agriculture 1763-1846 have not been resolved.93 
Nevertheless, when clustered the statistical evidence in print supports 
some general impressions: namely, that for long stretches of the 
eighteenth century the overall performance of agriculture as measured in 
terms of rates of change in output or productivity could be represented as 
“sluggish” and “unimpressive.”94 
 
 
Dates and years for turning points and discontinuities vary.  
Nevertheless, most extant exercises in data reconstruction suggest that 
an acceleration in the kingdom’s agricultural output, investment and 
perhaps in factor productivities either began but certainly persisted during 
the war with Revolutionary France.  It probably came discernibly 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
93   The modern wave of cliometric research began with classic studies by P. Deane and 
W.A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959: Trends and Structures (Cambridge, 
1969) and revisions by N.F.R. Crafts, British Economic Growth During the Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford, 1985) followed by extensive and ongoing debate over the numbers 
summarized by N.F.R. Crafts, ‘The First Industrial Revolution: Resolving the Slow 
Growth/Rapid Industrialization Paradox ,’ in Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 3 (2005), pp. 525-35. A range of estimates for the rate of growth of output 
tabulated by Allen, ‘Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution,’ was published before 
recent ingenious attempts were made by Clark and Broadberry, et al., (vide fn. 86) to 
bring consistency to the range of estimates in print for the growth of per capita incomes 
including incomes from agriculture. 
94   Allen, ‘Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution,’;  Crafts, ‘British Economic 
Growth. Some Difficulties of Interpretation, p. 49 estimated that only 6% of the rentals from 
agricultural land was reinvested in agriculture in the 1760s. The ratio had risen to 16% in  1801-
10;  G. Clark, ‘Yields per acre in English agriculture, 1250-1860: Evidence from 
Labour Inputs,’ in Economic History Review, 44 (1991), pp. 445-60; R.C. Allen, 
Enclosure and the Yeoman. The Agricultural Development of the South Midlands, 
1450-1850 (Oxford, 1992); R.V. Jackson, ‘Growth and Deceleration in English 
Agriculture,’ in Economic History Review, 38C (1985) pp. 333-57. A recent 
contribution to the debate is by D. Meredith and D. Oxley, ‘Food and Fodder: 
Feeding Britain, 1700-1900,’ in Past and Present, 222 (2014). Overton’s, 
Agricultural Revolution provides a more optimistic interpretation. 
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on stream after 1800, continued during the so-called decades of 
agricultural depression and distress in the aftermath of the war down to 
Caird’s Golden Age of Agriculture 1846-73.95  
 
 
Modern exercises in “conjectural quantification” are not inconsistent 
with a historiography of agricultural development during the Industrial 
Revolution that includes upswings in rates of growth, investment and 
productivity growth proceeding over two long cycles of rising and then 
falling prices of primary products between the outbreak of the French 
wars in 1793 and the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.96 Contemporary  
and well-referenced perceptions in agrarian history as well as statistical 
guesstimates all suggest that the owners and managers of the resources 
contained within the kingdom’s traditional, dominant and relatively un-
progressive sector for primary production responded to wartime 
incentives of rising prices, favourable shifts in the inter-sectoral terms of 
trade, flexible access to loans and credit and the lagging wages of their 
quasi-feudal workforce by raising rates of investment and diffusing known 
techniques for cultivation to feed the realm’s growing and urbanizing 
 
 
 
 
 
95 Allen, The British Revolution; Allen, ‘Agriculture in the Industrial Revolution,’; G. 
Clark, ‘Farm Wages and Living Standards in the Industrial Revolution: England, 1670- 
1869,’ in Economic History Review, 54 (2001), pp. 477-505 and G. Hueckel’s articles 
cited in fn. 91; E.L. Jones, Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1974); L.P. 
Adams, Agricultural Depression and Farm Relief in England, 1815-22 (London, 1972); B. 
Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce (Oxford, 1977). 
96   Investment data, are from Feinstein, ‘Capital Formation in Great Britain,’ and 
‘Capital Accumulation and the Industrial Revolution.’ The rise in numbers of acres 
enclosed by private acts of Parliament was particularly marked between 1800-15. Vide 
B. Holderness, ‘Agriculture ,’ in C. Feinstein and S. Pollard (eds.), Studies in Capital 
Formation in the United Kingdom (Oxford, 1988), pp. 9-34. The years of distress are 
covered by Adams, Agricultural Depression (London, 1922); Gash, ‘Rural 
Unemployment, 1815-34,’ pp. 145-57 and Wilks, ‘Readjustments in Arable Farming after 
the Napoleonic Wars.’ The “golden age” is described in C. Abel et al, History of 
Agriculture, 1846-1914 (Newton Abbot, 1964), chs. 1-3. 
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population, while at the same time supplying the state with extra taxes 
as well as the additional provisions, fibres, horses, fodder, timber and 
other organic materials required to wage warfare.
97 Contemporary 
observations support the view that during war the kingdom’s agricultural 
output grew at more impressive rates basically by taking waste, scrub 
and unenclosed land into cultivation. Landowners, farmers and their 
elastic supplies of cheaper labour  pushed the extensive margin for 
cultivation outwards, consolidated estates into managerial units with 
larger scale farms, drained, marled and limed the soils and 
supplemented the reclamation of under-cultivated land by speeding up 
the diffusion of familiar and proven techniques for the growth of crops 
and rearing of farm animals.98 
 
After 1815 when prices of primary products declined sharply and 
the real burdens from higher levels of taxation, poor relief and elevated 
rents (previously veiled by inflation) became exposed, representatives of 
the agricultural sector in  Parliament sought relief by reducing and shifting 
its tax burdens onto the urban economy.99 Landlords diversified their 
portfolios of wealth into minerals, transportation and urban property.100 In 
summary, several forces including the upswing in agricultural prices 
(associated with flexible money supplies, a pronounced shift in the inter-
sectoral terms of trade, intensified demands from the armed forces and 
enhanced protection from high freight rates by ship) all operated to pull 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 G. Clark, ‘The Long March of History. Farm wages, population and economic growth, 
England, 1209-1869,’ in Economic History Review, 60 (2007), p. 97-135 and A.H. 
John, ‘Farming in Wartime’ and the articles by Hueckel cited in fn. 91. 
98 G. Clark, ‘Land rental values and the agrarian economy: England and Wales,’ in 
European Review of Economic History, 6 (2002), pp. 281-308; R. Wordie, ‘Rent 
Movements and the English Tenant Farmer, 1700-1839,’ in R. Uselding (ed.), 
Research in Economic History, 6 (1981), pp. 192-215; M. Turner, Enclosures in Britain, 
1750-1830 (London, 1984); H.G. Hunt, ‘Landownership and Enclosures,’ in Economic 
History Review, 10 (1957) pp. 36-48; Hueckel’s articles cited in fn. 91; Hilton, Corn, 
Cash and Commerce; Gordon, Political Economy in Parliament; Gambles, The 
Boundaries of Political Economy. Data for the wage/rental ratio for this period is from 
Clark, ‘Land, rental values etc.’ pp. 281-308. 
99 J.V. Beckett, The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914 (Oxford, 1986); N. Gash, 
Aristocracy and People, Britain 1815-1865 (London, 1979. 
100 J. Habakkuk, Marriage, Debt and the Estates System. English Landownership, 
1650-1950 (Oxford, 1994) Chs. 6 and 7; M. Turner (ed.), Malthus and his Times 
(London, 1986)
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owners and managers of agrarian land and capital into a “cage”. From 
where and despite post war deflation - mitigated by the infamous 
protection from corn laws and repeal of the income tax – they maintained 
imperatives to invest, innovate and reduce costs. That option had become 
unavoidable for landed elites endeavouring to preserve their wealth, 
incomes, status and, above all, their political power.
101
 
 
In short: the wartime inflation followed by post war deflation seems 
in outcome to have strengthened an ongoing longer run impetus to 
agricultural progress. After 1815 the growth of output continued. Agreed, 
this conjuncture slowed the pace of structural charge towards an 
urbanized industrial economy. Nevertheless a price and rent cycle 
coinciding with warfare may be represented as a fortuitous interlude 
which helped circumvent the tendency of an otherwise less than 
progressive sector owned by a powerful ancien regime of landowners and 
managed by conservative tenant farmers to circumvent the tendencies of 
agriculture to run into diminishing returns and thereby to block long term 
progress towards an urban industrial economy? 102 After the war 
agriculture continued to develop and to support industrialization. While the 
famous controversy over the corn laws never polarized British society into 
any prolonged politically destabilizing and unprofitable conflict between 
“agrarians and industrializers”  of the kind that hindered development on 
the mainland.103 
 
Comparable geopolitical and macro-economic conditions surrounded  
Britain’s industrial sector as it proceeded along its famous transformation  
between 1763-1846. Annual growth rates (as constructed by Deane and 
Cole and revised in several publications by Crafts and Harley) reveal a 
decade of sharp acceleration to 1.8% per annum 1780-90, followed by an 
almost imperceptible decline in an annual rate of growth interpolated from 
1790-1811, succeeded by further accelerations (2.8% and 3.6%) over the 
decades 1811-21 and 1821-31. The leading critic of these estimates 
continues to insist upon his own claims to have uncovered “more 
representative” evidence for prices and qualities for the heterogeneous 
array of cotton textiles produced in England could be used to  
 
__________________ 
101 P.K. O’Brien, ‘Agriculture and the Home Market for English Industry, 1660-1820,’ in 
English Historical Review c. (1985), pp. 773-99; M. Turner, et al, Agricultural Rent in 
England, 1660-1914 (Cambridge, 1997). 
102  Allen, British Industrial Revolution, ch. 3; F. Crouzet, ‘The Impact of the French 
Wars on the British Economy,’ in H. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution, 
(London, 1989), pp. 189-210. 
103 B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the 
Making of the Modern World (London, 1967).
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construct  more acceptably weighted estimates of aggregated value 
added for the kingdom’s  rapidly growing industrial sector. Cuenca- 
Esteban offers an alternative (perhaps equally plausible?) index for 
industrial production that displays even higher rates of growth over the 
period from 1770-1831.He recognized, however, that we have “long 
reached the stage of diminishing returns in analysing the same body of 
data over and over again.” 104  
 
For present purposes may we simply note that on none of three rival 
indices did the wars from 1793-1815 precipitate fundamental 
discontinuities (negative or positive) in the pace and pattern of 
industrialization. Indeed nobody at the time claimed they had. Most 
mercantilist literature published during and after the wars under titles 
extolling “the wealth, power and resources of the British empire” was 
basically concerned to reassure Britons that their state possessed access  
 
 
 
 
104 Growth rates for total industrial output which (unlike agriculture) can be constructed 
within contained margins of error from records for annual production covering “significant” 
shares of total industrial output but also remain controversial. The rates cited in the text 
were constructed and defended by Crafts and Harley against the views of their critics. 
Vide. N.F. Crafts and K. Harley, ‘Output, Growth and the British Industrial Revolution: a 
restatement of the Crafts-Harley view,’ in Economic History Review, 45 (1992), pp. 703-
30. C.K. Harley and N.F.R. Crafts, ‘Cotton textiles and industrial output growth during the 
Industrial Revolution,’ in Economic History Review, critics of their index which in effect 
augments the rate of industrial production has been mounted by J. Cuenca-Esterban, 
‘British Textile Prices? 1770-1831: are British Growth Rates worth Revising once again?’ 
in Economic History Review, 47 (1994), pp.66-105. It generated a further reply 
( embodying another set of cotton textile prices) was published by C.K. Harley, ‘Cotton 
Textile Prices and the Industrial Revolution,’ in Economic History Review, 5 (1998) pp. 
49-83. In his attempt to mediate his way through the range of estimates now available to 
analyse rates of growth for gross domestic product, agriculture and industry, J. Mokyr, 
‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution,’ in C. Floud and Johnson (eds.), Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, pp, 1027 preferred to concentrated upon estimates 
based upon new research by G. Clark, ‘The Secret History of the Industrial Revolution,’; 
U.C. Davis, Working Paper in Economic History. Clark’s estimates in this and other papers 
cited above tend to show that discontinuities on nearly all indicators deployed to measure 
trends in economic growth occurred after and not before 1800. Is there any consensus in 
prospect? 
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to all the resources required to defend the realm and protect and extend 
its colonies and commerce overseas and support industrialization. 105 
 
Turning to that most frequently explored connexion between warfare 
and industrial growth, namely technology, historians also observe that in 
contrast to the great wars of the past century, only a confined range of 
inventions with spin offs for the long run growth of the civilian economy (or 
indeed for the effectiveness of the armed forces) have been directly 
associated with demands generated by this widespread and protracted 
conflict. 106 For France the deployment of airborne balloons for observation, 
and interchangeable parts for the assembly of weapons are cited. 107 For 
Britain there are references to experiments with the preservation of food, 
metal tanks to hold water pumped by steam power onto warships, biscuit 
making machinery and Brunel’s blocks and pulleys for the rigging of 
battleships and a boot making machine. Claims have been made that Britain 
became the arsenal for Europe during these wars. 108 
 
 
_____________________________ 
105 L. Magnusson, Mercantilism: the Shaping of an Economic Language (London 1994). 
There is a substantial bibliography of pamphlets and books written to refute the claims of 
radicals that the British economy had been severely damaged by the strains placed 
upon it by taxes and loans raised to mobilize resources for warfare. The counter and 
mainstream tradition of writing in mercantilist economics and political arithmetic 
continued for decades after the final victory at Waterloo and is well covered by the 
Goldsmiths Collection of Economics Literature at the University of London Library. 
Characteristic writers include: G. Chalmers, Comparative Views and J. Lowe, The 
Present State of England. It is summarized by: Cookson, ‘Political Arithmetic’ and E. 
McCleod, Wars of Ideas. British Attitudes to Wars Against Revolutionary France 
(Aldershot, 1998). 
106  Vide P. Hoffman’s recent thesis, Why Did Europe Conquer the World? 
(Princeton, 2015); K.W. Chase, Firearms – A Global History to 1700 (Cambridge, 
2003); M. Roe-Smith, Military Enterprise and Technical Change. Perspectives on 
American Experience (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); W. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power. 
Technology, Armed Force and Society since 1000 (Chicago, 1982); R. O’Connell, 
Of Arms and Men. A History of War, Weapons and Aggression (Oxford , 1989); M. 
Van Crefeld, Technology and War from 2000BC to the Present (London, 1989). 
107 K. Alder, Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France 
(Princeton, 1999). 
108 Harvey, Collision of Empires, pp. 51-57; Emsley, British Society and the French 
Wars (London, 1979); C. Trebilock, ‘Spinoff in British Economic History,’ in 
Economic History Review, 22 (1969) pp. 74-90; C. Fox, The Arts of Industry in the 
Age of Enlightenment (New Haven, 2009); Mokyr found a few minor connexions – 
Mokyr, Enlightened Economy, p. 344.
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      Future research might uncover the appearance of other  inventions 
associated with the capital goods, materials and modes of organization 
designed and developed by or for the armed forces. What has been 
documented is an elaboration upon sequences of developments and 
improvements which began after the American War associated with the 
production of armaments, with the spread of steam power and, above 
all, with the construction and maintenance of warships with potential 
spill-overs and externalities for post war shipbuilding, metallurgy and 
engineering. There were certainly connexions to the network of 
organizations and enterprises engaged with shipping and commerce 
overseas that experienced booms as well as slumps connected to 
warfare. 109 
 
This raises the unanswerable question of whether  upswings 
associated with the fortunes of mercantilist warfare engendered 
expectations that promoted research and development, investment and 
ultimately growth? Such connexions could be heuristically pursued by 
analysing how the fiscal, monetary and commercial policies implemented 
by the state to wage war may, on balance, have promoted benign 
outcomes for the longer term development of major industries. 110 For 
example, the shift after 1797 into an inconvertible currency and a greater 
 
 
 
 
  
109 R. Morriss, The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy (Cambridge, 2011). 
Connexions to shipping and shipbuilding are elaborated in the final section. Few 
claims have been validated by historians for anything approximating to development of 
a military-industrial complex as part of the industrial revolution – vide. P. Deane, ‘War 
and Industrialization,’ in J.M. Winter (ed.), War and Economic Development 
(Cambridge, 1975), pp. 91-102; John, ‘War and the British Economy,’ pp. 329-44 draws 
positive connexions but for earlier periods.  No credence for this thesis can be traced  in 
P. Hoffman’s recent book, Why Did Europe Conquer the World? (Princeton, 2015), but 
vide a forthcoming book by P. Satia, Empire of Guns (Penguin, 2018) which deals with 
development of an armaments industry. 
110 Connexion s between the macro-economic monetary and fiscal policies and the 
development of a sample of British industries have been elaborated in previously 
published papers by P.K. O’Brien, ‘The Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars 1793-1815 in the Long Run Growth of the British Economy,’ in Review, 12 (1989), 
pp. 335-96 and ‘Taxation for British Mercantilism from the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to 
the Peace of Paris (1783).’ (in R. Sanchez-Torres (ed.)), War, State and Development. 
Fiscal Military States in the Eighteenth Century (Pamplona, 2008), pp. 295-356, 
‘Taxation for the Wars against France’ and O’Brien, ‘British Incomes and Property in the 
Early Nineteenth Century,’ in Economic History Review, 12 (1959), pp. 255-67; O’Brien 
and Palma, ‘The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street.’
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reliance on taxation relaxed the terms and expanded conduits for access 
to loans and credits even for riskier ventures. Wartime policies reinforced 
established traditions of fiscal mercantilism that operated to promote 
exports; maintain lower rates of taxation upon raw materials and inputs 
utilized by industry. They also elevated protection against imports of 
manufactures up to virtually prohibitive levels and accorded relatively 
favourable fiscal treatment to technologically progressive manufactures 
(like cotton textiles) as well as such strategically significant industries 
(such as iron, coal and shipbuilding). By default the state condoned as 
administratively unavoidable the widespread evasion of liabilities for direct 
taxation by the owners and managers of industrial and commercial 
capital. 
111
 
 
 
Monetary policy promoted inflationary conditions for several 
industries (coal, iron, copper ores, metal, building materials, leather, hosiery 
and candles) for which data for both wage rates and prices for outputs 
happen to be available. That data allows us to observe and measure a 
classic symptom of periods of inflation, namely a lag of wages behind 
prices and an unintended transfer of income from labour to capital, savings 
and investment. 112 
 
 
Nevertheless nearly all industries became afflicted and constrained in 
greater or lesser degrees by excise and customs duties levied on their 
inputs of raw materials and intermediate goods and upon their final outputs. 
These negative but variable effects from higher rates of taxation upon the 
growth in the volumes of output produced by a wide array of industries and 
services have been analysed elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 O’Brien, ‘Taxation for the Wars against France’; J.V. Beckett and M. Turner, 
‘Taxation and Economic Growth in Eighteenth Century England,’ in Economic History 
Review, 43 (1990), pp. 377-403; Bowen, War and British Society and the bulk of 
pamphlets on fiscal policy contained in the Goldsmiths Collection of the University of 
London Library. 
112 This familiar lag and its implications for standards of living is discussed by G.N. 
Von Tunzelman, ‘Trends in Real Wages, 1750-1850, pp. 33-49 and F. Crouzet, 
‘Guerre et Salaires. Le Cas De L’Angleterre.’ His data displays a lag in real wages 
even for skilled workers pp. 71-85. The lag of agricultural wages behind rents has 
been exposed by Clark, ‘Land Rental Values.
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At the time fiscal policy generated the greatest attention from interest 
groups behind prolonged debates in Parliament and a voluminous 
bibliography of contemporary comment that contains contributions to 
political economy. Most of the authors of this polemical literature deplored 
the social incidence and adverse economic effects of higher taxation. 
Predictably they also neglected to counterbalance their condemnations of 
taxation not only against potential outcomes flowing from military defeat, 
but also against some  unintended but not insignificant longer term effects 
that emanated from several fiscal  and financial policies designed to 
mobilize resources for the forces of the crown. 
113
 
 
 
For example, transitions in scale and scope, already underway    
before 1793, in two major industries, coal and iron, (restored to positions 
of prominence in recent texts on the industrial revolution) were almost 
certainly accelerated by fiscal and commercial policies and shifts towards 
autarky promoted by the conflict at sea. 114   Before the war something 
like 30% to 40% of the kingdom’s annual consumption of timber and bar 
iron took the form of imports from Norway, Sweden, Russia, Prussia and 
other countries with access to ports along the Baltic Sea.115 Both raw 
materials particularly timber, which also provided sources of heat and 
energy and household fuel, had been subjected to complex but relatively 
low burdens of customs duties calibrated to favour imports in British 
ships. 
 
 
 
113 W. Kennedy, English Taxation, 1640-1799 (London, 1913) and T. Dome, The Political 
Economy of Public Finance in Britain, 1767-1873 (London, 2004). The debates in 
Parliament are in W. Cobbett, Parliamentary History, Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates, 
vol.1, 1803-04 to vol. 22, 1812 and Hansards, Parliamentary Debates, 24-31 (1812-13 – 
1815). 
114 A.E. Wrigley, Continuity, Chance and Change (Cambridge, 1988); Allen, The British 
Industrial Revolution and P. Mathias, ‘Energy and the Industrial Revolution,’ in Revista 
de Storia Economica, 19 (2003), pp. 109-133. 
115 According to Patrick Colquhoun, more than a third of Britain’s supplies of timber 
continued to be imported from the Baltic even in wartime. P. Colquhoun, Treatise on 
the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire (London, 1812), p. 90. J.R. 
McCulloch estimated British iron production at 68,000 tons for 1788 compared to 
50,000 tons imported from Sweden and Russia. J.R. McCulloch, A Dictionary of 
Commerce (London, 1839), p. 735 and Public Record Office, Customs 10901 for 
imports.
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During the war, duties on Russian and Swedish bar iron doubled.116 
On Baltic timber, tariffs rose in two steps from 6.5/- to 28.5/- a load. In1809 
when ministers under political and geopolitical pressure reduced the 
kingdom’s dependence on that region they raised the duty to 58/- a load in 
order to favour production and trade in Imperial (Canadian) timber. 117 That 
controversial decision was occasioned by the risks of predation from enemy 
privateers, embargoes by northern powers and domestic pressures for 
pressures for imperial preferences. 118   It was above all sustained by the 
massive augmentation in the costs of shipping of heavy and bulky raw 
materials, such as timber and bar iron from the Baltic to British ports in 
wartime.119 Already by 1808-11 the average price (cif) of a load of Baltic 
timber had risen by four to five times above pre-war levels.120 Thereafter 
and in competition with Canadian imports, the volume and average price 
declined sharply over the final stages of the war, but not enough to 
counteract the pressures from self-interested groups of merchants, 
shippers and owners of British woodlands for the continuation of imperial 
preferences when the high costs of freighting timber across 
the Atlantic were exposed after the war.121 
 
 
 
 
 
116 Duties on bar iron from Public Record Office Customs 10901 and Report of the 
Custom Tariff of the United Kingdom, Parliamentary Paper 1898 (85). 
117 Timber duties are set out in the ‘Report of the Select Committee to Take into 
Consideration the Duties on Timber,’ Parliamentary Papers 1835 (19), p. 384 and 
Accounts and Papers, Parliamentary Paper 1826-27 (18), p. 267. 
118 Pressure group activity can be traced in Public Record Office Board of Trade 
Papers,  BT5/10 and Report of the Select Committee Appointed to Consider the 
Means of  Improving and Maintaining the Foreign Trade of the Country in 
Parliamentary Papers, 1821 (6). 
 119 Vide Reports in Monthly Magazine, January, March and July 1801, June 1803                        
and February 1809; R.G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (Cambridge, Mass., 
1926); F. Crouzet, L’economie britannique et le blocus continental, pp. 91-93, 337, 
34-45, 398 and 420-22; Journals of the House of Commons annually 1793-1815 
include appendices of data related to prices of imported timber. 
120 H. Bliss, The Timber Trade (Goldsmiths Collection, University of London Library, 
London, 1822) p. 70 and T. Cooke, Thoughts and Details on High and Low Prices 
(London, 1824), p. 417. S. Cook, Observations on the Timber Trade (London, 
Goldsmiths Collection, 1821); Bliss, Timber Trade; Parliamentary Paper 1821 (6); 
McCulloch, Commercial Dictionary, pp. 1150-54. 
121 The tariffs are recorded in Customs 10901 and Parliamentary Paper 1898 (85). 
The wartime history of the timber trade is covered by Bliss, Timber Trade.
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Bar iron of the highest quality continued to be purchased from 
Sweden and Russia for the manufacture weapons for the army and navy. 
Nevertheless the total volume imported decreased from around 50,000 
tons in 1788-92 to about 20,000 tons and falling (1811-15). 122 
 
Changes to tariffs and more significantly to the risks and costs of 
importing wood and bar iron from the Baltic (initiated and sustained by 
warfare and its aftermath) raised incentives to accelerate the already 
ongoing process of import substitution by Britain’s coal and iron 
industries. Both industries successfully resisted attempts by ministers, 
desperately seeking tax revenues, to impose excises on their outputs. 
While iron, much more than coal, benefitted directly and indirectly from 
augmented demands from the navy, army and ordnance departments for 
their products. Both industries also gained from the high rates of 
investment maintained in wartime to extend, integrate and improve the 
country’s system of internal transportation, canals, rivers and roads as 
well as the extra protection afforded by a greatly enlarged navy for 
transportation by sea around the coasts of the Isles.123 
 
Responding  to incentives heightened by war to replace imported 
timber with domestically produced, coke smelted iron, puddled iron for 
Swedish and Russian imports of bar iron and wood fuel with domestic 
coal (mined and more easily and more cheaply transported along the 
canals, rivers and protected coastal waterways of the Isles) both these 
heavy industries experienced remarkable accelerations in their rates of 
growth that cannot be disconnected from stimulus afforded by the state’s 
engagement in warfare. Domestic pig iron production probably multiplied 
by a factor of 3.5 between 1788-92 and 1811-15 – a period when the 
_______________________ 
122   Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p. 140; C. Evans et al, ‘Baltic Iron 
and the British Iron Industry in the Eighteenth Century,’ in Economic History Review, 55 
(2002), pp. 642-55. Purchases for the armed forces are recorded in War Office Papers, 
Public Record Office WO281; Appendices to House of Commons Journals and reports 
from Commissioners of Military Inquiry in Parliamentary Papers 1806 (2), 1806 (5) and 
1812 (4). Corts links to the Navy are explored in R. Mott and P. Singer, Henry Cort, 
Creator of Puddled Iron (London, 1983). 
123 Raw data for investment in internal transportation are available in the form of the 
numbers of bills and estimated costs submitted to Parliament for expenditures on the 
construction of turnpike roads, canals, improvements to rivers. They are cited in A. 
Gayer et al, Growth and Fluctuations in the British Economy, and calibrated and 
revised by C. Feinstein and S. Pollard (eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United 
Kingdom, 1750-1920 (Oxford, 1988) and by Feinstein, in ‘Capital Formation in the United 
Kingdom.’
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price of bar iron declined in real terms and when imports fell from about 
43% to 6% of total consumption. 
124 By 1821 the industry’s long transition 
from charcoal to coke smelting was completed and it had recovered from 
the excess capacity of the immediate post war years. 125 
 
Although the coal industry may not have experienced anything 
impressive by way of total factor productivity growth during the industrial 
revolution the evidence for accelerated rates of expansion during wartime 
also remains unmistakeable. 126 Total output of all mines may have 
doubled between 1790 and 1815 while real prices per ton at points of 
delivery outside London probably declined because tolls at other ports  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
124 P. Riden, ‘The Output of the British Iron Industry before 1879,’ in Economic History 
Review, 30 (1977) pp. 442-59; C.K. Hyde, The British Iron Industry (Princeton, 1977); 
R. Church (ed.), The Coal and Iron Industries (Oxford, 1994). The development of both 
industries has been cogently analysed by Allen, British Industrial Revolution, chs 4 and 
9. 
125 T.S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution (Manchester, 1924) and H. 
Scrivenor, A Comprehensive History of the Iron Industry (London, 1841) 
126 The exercise by Clark and Jacks to measure total factor productivity for the coal 
mining is based on data from the Northumberland Durham coalfield and deliveries by 
coastal transportation into London, vide G. Clark and D. Jacks, ‘Coal and the Industrial 
Revolution 1700-1869,’ in European Review of Economic History, 11 (2007), pp. 39-73 
is under-specified. By the late eighteenth century only 30% and declining of mined coal 
came from that coalfield and was delivered down the coast to London. Vide. J. 
Mundella’s estimates and discussion in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 10 
(1878) pp. 87-112 and McCulloch, Commercial Dictionary, pp. 290-93 and 433. 
Estimates for total output are offered by M. Flinn, History of the British Coal Industry, 2 
vols (Oxford, 1984), table 1.2 which show totals of 3.0m tons for 1700, 5.2m tons for 
1750, 8.9m for 1775, 15.0m for 1800, 22.3m for 1800 and 30.4m for 1830. Mundella’s 
estimates, pp. 87-712 display a rise from 7.6m tons for 1790 to 15.6m in 1815.
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remained lower than they were in the capital. 127   Even for consumers in 
London rather late in the day, the government began to regulate 
combinations of producers, shippers and distributors, selling coal to 
households and industries located in the capital. 128 At the same time 
taxes upon exports were jacked up by 70%. This presumably increased 
the elasticity of coal supply for domestic use and restricted the diffusion of 
cheap British fuel and energy for rival competitors (Holland and France) 
on the mainland.129 
 
Over the second half of the eighteenth century coal fields beyond 
the boundaries of north eastern England opened up and mines utilizing 
improved Newcomen and eventually Watt engines for drainage, haulage 
and winding and railed ways for carriage were providing cheaper access 
to the extending network of inland waterways. Whether the diffusion of 
these technologies led to some or any increase in total factor productivity 
is not germane to the argument elaborated here. That argument is 
concerned to draw attention to rising freight rates, higher export taxes, 
repeated interruptions to the timber trade – all associated with warfare – 
that operated to intensify the extension and deepening of coal mining in 
Britain. The more rapid the exploitation of coal and technologies 
associated with its diffusion as a cheap source of energy and fuel for such 
heat intensive industries (as iron, copper, glass, salt, brewing sugar) 
pulled owners and managers of the coal industry into another “cage” of 
fixed investments and commitments that promoted and maintained a 
trajectory for long term development for the heavy industries of the first 
industrial revolution both during the war and thereafter over the difficult 
decades of post war adjustment and deflation. Its contribution to England’s 
precocious industrialization in and to feeding the nation in wartime cannot 
(as Wrigley has demonstrated) be understated. 130 
 
_________________________ 
127 Flinn, History of the Coal Industry and offers a price index for coal moving from 100 
in 1775 to 123 in 1800 and 128 in 1830, well below the general rate of inflation. Coal 
used to smelt metals was tax free. Although average costs of shipping coal to London 
1793-1815 was about double pre-war levels, W.J. Hausman, ‘The English Coastal Coal 
Trade, 1691-1910: How rapid was Productivity Growth?’ in Economic History Review, 
40 (1987), pp. 588-96. 
128 Legislation designed to enforce competition in the production and distribution of coal 
sold in London are discussed by P.Sweezy, Monopoly and Competition in the English 
Coal Trade, 1550-1850 (London, 1996) pp. 34, 39, 59 and 79; R. Smith, Sea Coal for 
London (London, 1961), pp. 144-51; R. Stevenson, Observation on the Coal Trade in 
the Port of Newcastle (London, 1789); T.S. Ashton and J. Sykes, The Coal Industry of 
the Eighteenth Century (Manchester, 1929), pp. 211-15. 
129 Customs 10901 and C. Beaumont, Treatise on the Coal Trade (London, 1789) pp. 
34-35 and 211-12. 
130 E.A. Wrigley, The Path to Sustained Growth. England’s Transition from an Organic 
Economy to an Industrial Revolution, (Cambridge, 2016), and P. Malamina, ‘Energy 
Consumption in England and Italy,’ in Economic History Review, 69, 2016, pp. 78-103. 
The technologies used for the extraction of coal and their diffusion are discussed by 
R.L. Galloway, Annals of Coal Mining (London, 1893); Ashton and Sykes, Coal Trade of 
the Eighteenth Century and Flinn, British Coal Industry.
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To sum up, after the war and as all indices show, British industry 
rebounded. Major industries such as iron, coal and shipbuilding improved 
upon their capacities for  growth built up in the hothouse conditions of a 
wartime economy by  cutting costs, diffusing materials and technologies 
with demonstrable potential for future improvement and above all by 
holding onto the advantages of entry and access to foreign and imperial 
markets and sources of raw materials and supplies overseas which had 
been secured and thereafter retained by the hegemonic power of the 
Royal Navy, conjoined to the competitive superiority of Britain’s mercantile 
marine with its linkages to the Island’s expanded and competitively 
superior shipbuilding industry. Is it not necessary for historians to 
investigate how warfare might have on balance promoted a transition from 
one trajectory for industrial growth to another and potentially superior set 
based on heavy industry that came on stream once peace returned? 
 
 
7. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic War as the Last Great 
Mercantilist Conflict and the Culmination of Britain’s Maritime 
Strategy for Security with Economic Growth 
 
Metternich, Talleyrand and other European statesmen gathered at 
the Congress of Vienna, recognized that the Peace Treaty of 1815 
marked a conjuncture in great power politics when the Royal Navy had 
secured indisputable command of the oceans. 131  The kingdom 
possessed: the largest fleet of merchant vessels, workforce of skilled 
seamen and shipbuilding capacity in the world. 132  During the war years 
London, Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool, Hull, Newcastle and numerous other 
port cities had reconstructed their harbours and shipyards and extended 
their commercial, financial and mercantile networks in order to continue to 
reap extraordinary shares of future gains from the integration of a world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131  C. Wilkinson, The British Navy and the State in the 18th Century (London, 2004).C. 
Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh; A. Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the 
British Navy Shaped the Modern World (London, 2005). 
132 R. Hope, A New History of British Shipping (London, 1990); G. Bayley, Tables 
Showing the Progress of the Shipping Interest of the British Empire (London, 1844)
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economy as it moved along a trajectory of more peaceful expansion under 
the hegemony of the Royal Navy.133   Henry Dundas (the Minister For War) 
had anticipated this outcome in his memorandum to Ministers as early as 
1800 when he wrote: “It is obvious that the present strength and pre-
eminence of this country is owing to the extent of its resources arising 
from its commerce and its naval power which are inseparably connected.” 
134 
Crowding out, misallocation and destruction of national resources 
certainly occurred as unavoidable costs of participation in twenty- two 
years of warfare. Nevertheless, when the Government returned the 
currency  to the gold standard in 1819 the augmented values of the 
kingdom’s natural endowments (land, minerals and coal); stocks of private 
fixed, circulating and human capital, supplies of useful knowledge, state 
capital, (battleships, fortifications, naval infrastructure, barracks and stores 
of weapons for the defence of the realm and protection of its commerce 
and assets overseas) all became available to an economy on the move 
and well placed to take advantage of opportunities flowing from the 
rebound and expansion of the post war global economy. 135 
 
 
Britain’s prolonged mobilization for successful warfare at sea, 
together with the disruption to rival port cities by French and other 
European armies fighting on the mainland had almost certainly left the 
maritime sector of the Island’s economy  with expanded and more efficient 
capacities to take advantage of opportunities for servicing of overseas 
trade and commerce. A quarter of a century of complementary 
expenditures by the state and the private sector on: the construction of 
ships; for extensions and improvements to the Island’s maritime 
infrastructures: for the training of seamen; for the expansion and 
reorganization of the mercantile and financial networks available to 
coordinate, fund, insure and transport increasing volumes of merchandize 
and passengers by sea to every part of an integrating world economy had 
 
 
_______________________ 
133 Estimates for infrastructural expenditures on ports and their facilities have been 
published in several publications by Feinstein. Vide: C.F. Feinstein and S. Pollards 
(eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom, 1750-1920 (Oxford, 
1988). Structural improvements to the commercial organization surrounding trade 
has been analysed by Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain; Nash, ‘The 
Organization of Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy’, pp.95-152 and 
Gauci, The Merchants of London. 
134 The Dundas Memorandum is in Pitt Papers 30/8/207 dated 31.3.1800. 
135 R. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean. A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815; 
R. Backhaus, Navies and State Formation  (Berlin, 2012).J.B. Williams, British 
Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion, 1750-1850 (London, 1972); A. Herman, 
To Rule the Waves.  
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all been raised as an outcome of warfare to levels and standards that 
could not have been anticipated before the outbreak of a Revolution in 
France. 136 
 
With the exception of the conflict with the United States and its 
European allies, opportunities to displace and replace competitors for the 
gains from trade and servicing a world economy had been taken from the 
time of the first Anglo-Dutch War of 1651 onwards. The destruction, 
degradation and depreciation of the rival mercantile sectors of France, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Scandinavia, Russia, India and, after 
1808, the United States, competing for these gains occurred on an 
unprecedented degree during the war with Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France. 137 Intensified predation by a virtual fleet of British privateers 
(supported by their all-powerful Royal Navy) inflicted relatively more 
serious losses on the enemy and neutral shipping, sailing along lanes 
connecting the economies of Europe and their seaborne trades with the 
Americas, Africa, Asia and Australasia. The conflict also witnessed a 
sequence of dislocations of port cities on the mainland, disruptions 
occasioned by Napoleon’s intrusive but unsuccessful continental system;  
as well as the forcible opening of Iberian, Dutch, French, Ottoman and 
Mughal empires to British trade. 138 
 
 
 
 
136 C. Wright and C. Fayle, A History of Lloyds (London, 1928); P.K. O’Brien, ‘The 
Hanoverian State and the Defeat of the Continental System,’ in R. Findlay et al (eds.), 
Eli Heckscher, International Trade and Economic History (Cambridge, Mass, 2006) pp. 
373-407; The contemporary commentator, C. Moreau documents and quantifies 
Britain’s enhanced competitive position in the world economy over this period. Vide 
Moreau, Chronological Records and State of the Trade of Great Britain (London, 
1822). 
137 P. Crowhurst, The Defence of British Trade 1689-1815 (Folkestone, 1977). C. 
Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (Cambridge, 1957) 
and England’s Apprenticeship, 1603-1763 (London, 1965); L. Gomes, Foreign Trade 
and the National Economy (Basingstoke, 1987); K.E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories 
(Toronto, 1944); N. Koehn, The Power of Commerce. Economics and Governance in 
the First British Empire (Ithaca, 1994). 
138 D. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter, 
1990); L. David and S. Engermann, Naval Blockades in Peace and War (Cambridge, 
2006).J. Lynch, ‘British Policy in Latin America, 1783-1808’, in Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 1 (1969), pp. 1-30; H. R. C. Wright, ‘The Anglo-Dutch Dispute in 
the East, 1814-24’, in Economic History Review, 3 (1950), pp. 232-46; A. Frost, The 
Global Reach of Empire. Britain’s Maritime Expansion in the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans, 1764-1815 (Carlton, 2003); Jones, Britain and the World; P. K. O’Brien and 
A. Clesse (eds.), Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846-1914 and the United States 1941-
2001 (Aldershot, 2002), Knight, Britain Against Napoleon.
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Looking back from that vantage point of the Congress of Vienna it 
must be anachronistic to ignore the averted threat of military invasion, to 
concentrate upon hypothetical opportunity costs and to construct 
narratives for British industrialization that fail to include the long term 
material advantages and potential that maritime sectors of the Island 
kingdom’s economy derived from final victory over France and its allies. 
Command of the ocean not only consolidated and maintained external 
security conjoined to internal stability for a society undergoing rapid 
urbanization, but Britain’s naval hegemony brought to a virtual close 
centuries of violence at sea and contained all prospects for a resurgence 
of European colonial warfare in the Americas, in South and East Asia 
and in Africa. 139  By 1815 geopolitical preconditions were in place for the 
formation of a liberal international economic order that allowed overseas 
trade to widen geographically; integrate more regions into global markets 
for commodity, trade and services, to promote the movements of capital 
and labour and stimulate the diffusion of technologies to a degree 
inconceivable during an ancien mercantilist economic order. 140 
 
Britain emerged from the wars with revolutionary France in pole 
position in a new international economic order with an extended 
territorial empire, naval bases in every part of the world and an 
enlarged and more efficient maritime sector linked to export 
industries poised to sell higher high shares of their outputs overseas. 
Meanwhile the economies of France, Portugal, Spain, Holland, 
Denmark, Venice, Russia, even the United States and other rivals, 
slowly recovered many of the competitive advantages for trade that 
they were developing between the Peace of Paris (1783) and the 
outbreak of the French Revolution six years later. The relative 
decline of rivals provided space for the Island’s maritime sector, 
which since the times of Cromwell, had played a major part in 
leading the economy to a plateau of opportunities from where a 
sustainable transition to an industrialized economy would not be 
__________________ 
139 Roger, Command of the Oceans. Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty and G. 
Modelski and W. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics (Seattle, 1993).  For 
contemporary views of the economic state and status of Britain and its empire within the 
global economy of the day read Colquhoun, Treatise on the Wealth, Power and 
Resources of the British Empire; Chalmers, Estimates of the Comparative Strengths of 
Great Britain; Lowe, Present State of England; Moreau, Chronological Records of the 
British Royal and Commercial Navy and numerous other booklets in the Goldsmiths 
Collection, University of London Library. 
140 M. Robson, A History of the Royal Navy. The Napoleonic Wars (London, 2014).  
J. Klaits and M. Hatzel (eds.), The Global Ramifications of the French Revolution 
(Cambridge, 1994);C.A. Bayley, The Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the 
World, 1780-1830 (London, 1989); W.R. Thompson, The Emergence of Global Political 
Economy (London, 2000) and G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London, 1994). 
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 checked either by the relatively small size of the United Kingdom’s home 
market or by the risks to specialization from potential shortages of food 
and raw materials which attended the urbanization of a growing share of 
a workforce, generating increasing returns as it agglomerated in 
towns and factories. 
141
 
 
These outcomes consolidated by victory in the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars, together with the stimulus that they had imparted to 
agriculture and industry add up to a view of that conflict as a conjuncture 
in the kingdom’s economic history that brought a long commitment to 
mercantilism to a successful conclusion and thereby offered particularly 
strong advantages and opportunities for the Island’s industrializing 
economy. Such post hoc representations would not, moreover, have 
surprised mercantilists of the day who never hesitated to extol links 
between power with profit. 142   Classical economists and their neo-liberal 
successors would, however, only accept the “realpolitic” embodied in a 
view that the unintended economic consequence flowing from 
mercantilism and warfare could, on balance, be positive for progress of 
the First Industrial Revolution with deep scepticism. 143 Their posture of 
antipathy to mercantilism seems, however, to be based upon a superficial 
reading of recent scholarship in the history of economic thought. 144 
Perhaps this ideologically unwelcome take and emphasis on positive 
connexions between investment for warfare and Britain’s economic 
progress might become nothing more than ideological if it becomes 
possible to validate mainstream perceptions of the day with reference to a 
fully articulated and acceptable set of balance of payments accounts 
going back to the mid-seventeenth century. 
 
 
141 Schmoller emphasized the geopolitics behind economic growth more than a 
century ago. See G. Schmoller, The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance 
(New York, 1967). His views are echoed by: Findlay and O’Rourke in their recently 
published text, Power and Plenty; and by S.A. Reinert, Translating Empire. Emulation 
and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 2011) and P. Vries, State 
Economy and the Great Divergence (London, 2015). 
142 L. Magnusson, Mercantilist Economics and Reinert, Translating Empire. 
143 Silbener, Problem of War in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought; Mokyr, 
Enlightened Economy; for a critique read S. Rashid, 'Economists, Economic 
Historians and Mercantilism,’ in Scandinavian Economic History Review, 28 (1980) 
pp. 1-15 and R.K. Schaeffer, The Entelechies of Mercantilism, vol. 29 (1981) pp. 1-
16. 
144 E. Reinhert, et al., Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development 
(Cheltenham, 2016); C. Perrota, ‘Is the Mercantilist Theory of the Balance of Trade 
really Erroneous?’ in History of Political Economy, 23 (1991) pp. 301-35; ‘The 
Preclassical Theory of Development: Increased Consumption Raises Productivity ,’ in 
History of Political Economy, 29 (1997) pp. 295-326; L. Magnusson, Mercantilism. 
The Shaping of an Economic Language (London, 1994).
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Alas, prospects for quantifying the range of Britain’s evolving 
economic relationships with the rest of the world (including its Irish colony) 
over a chronology (say from the passage of Cromwell’s navigation act of 
1651 to its repeal two centuries later) continue to look entirely remote. 
Indeed a line of distinguished scholars who have grappled with the 
sources consider for trade in services such accounts could not be 
constructed within acceptable margins of error. 145 
 
Their scholarly caution has, moreover, been vindicated by the 
convincing critique made by Nash of a set of “controlled conjectures” by 
Brezis published in the Economic History Review for several items on the 
current account of the balance of payments for benchmark years going 
back to  1710. They include figures for net earnings from shipping and 
mercantile profits, together with a set of guesses for net outflows or 
inflows derived from servicing Britain’s foreign debt. 146 Their compiler did 
not respond to a challenge to publish the procedures and data she utilized 
to construct one of the standard and key components for balance of 
payments accounts, namely commodity imports at current (cif) prices, or 
explain why her data for exports was not comprehensive. Yet this debate 
over numbers has confirmed that the construction of acceptable estimates 
for Britain’s balance of payments in current prices as Ralph Davis and 
Imlah told us, may not be possible for the period before, say, the 1770s. 
147 
 
 
 
145 L.A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (New York, 1939); H.C. Hunter, How 
England got Its Merchant Marine, 1066-1776 (New York, 1935); R. Davis, The Rise of 
Atlantic Economies (London, 1973) quantified what he could and historicized a 
plausible story. Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth; R. Davis, Rise of English 
Shipping; R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade and W. 
Minchinton (ed.), The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries (London, 1969). 
146 E. Brezis, ‘Foreign Capital Flows in the Century of Britain’s Industrial Revolution: 
New Estimates, controlled Conjectures,’ in Economic History Review, 48 (1995); R. 
Nash, ‘The Balance of Payments and Foreign Capital Flows in Eighteenth Century 
England: a Comment,’ in Economic History Review, 50 (1997) pp. 110-125. E. Brezis, 
‘Did Foreign Capital Flows Finance the Industrial Revolution?’ a reply in Economic 
History Review, 50 (1997), pp. 129-32. Her mimeo is cited but apparently not utilized 
in Cuenca-Esterban’s reconstruction of the accounts for 1772-1820. Vide J. Cuenca- 
Esterban, ‘The British Balance of Payments, 1772-1820: Indian Transfers and War 
Finance,’ in Economic History Review, 54 (2001), pp. 58-86. 
147 Davis, Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade; Imlah, Economic 
Elements.
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Nevertheless, these and other attempts to envisage stylized 
balance of payments accounts lend support to perceptions (already 
familiar to historians and most contemporary commentators) on long term 
trends in the volumes of Britain’s commodity trade with the rest of the 
world based upon official statistics which refer to exports and imports 
measured in constant prices.  This imperfect data has often been used to 
estimate trends in rates of growth for decades between two periods of 
peaceful trade, 1717-21 to 1787-91, when average annual rates of growth 
for volumes of retained imports (1.7%) and domestic exports (1.5%) were 
not far apart. 148   Unless the  net  barter terms of trade were shifting 
against domestic exports, smuggling was on the increase, or debt 
servicing obligations to the rest of the world were already at high levels 
early on in the eighteenth century the numbers suggests there is no 
statistical basis for suggestions that a surplus of commodity imports over 
several decades of that century could not have been funded by earnings 
from invisibles (shipping, insurance, mercantile profits etc) which had 
reached the magnitudes suggested by the lower bound estimates  
constructed by Nash for 1700 and 1770. 
 
Thereafter (1772-75) and before to the outbreak of the wars with 
France (1788-92) when the rate of growth for the volume of retained 
imports just about doubled and commodity exports (growing at around 2% 
per annum) failed to keep up, deficits on the balance of trade could well 
have widened. 149 Furthermore, they began to diverge at a time when 
earnings from invisibles also came under intensified, geopolitical and 
competitive pressures from the navies and merchant marines of rival 
economies (France, Spain, the Netherlands and the United States). From 
the American declaration of independence in 1776 to the outbreak of war 
with Revolutionary France in February 1793, volumes of re-exports 
leaving British ports remained at levels some twenty to thirty percent 
 
 
 
148 This official set is the foundation for all attempts to construct estimates for exports, 
imports and re-exports in constant and current prices: vide: B. Mitchell, Abstract of 
British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962) section XI. See F. Crouzet’s classic 
article ‘Towards an Export Economy: British Exports during the Industrial Revolution,’ in 
Explorations in Economic History, 17 (1980), pp. 48-93. The growth rates cited are 
based upon official values which are taken from Mitchell’s abstract. 
149 From 1772-1820 data on commodities imported, exported and re-exported are 
available from: Mitchell, Abstract; Davis, The Industrial Revolution and from 
Reconstructions published in several papers by Cuenca-Esterban listed in the 
bibliography to the book edited by L. Prados De La Escosura, Exceptionalism and 
Industrialization. Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815  
(Cambridge, 2004). 
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below those attained before that conflict disrupted Atlantic and intra- 
European trades. Since British earnings from services (and even 
commodity exports) sold overseas remained highly correlated to volumes 
of re-exports, official records for those trades (supported by Cuenca- 
Esteban’s estimates in current prices) are congruent with the gloomy 
assessments of the time that the years surrounding the American 
rebellion, war for independence and its immediate aftermath can be 
interpreted as a discernible setback for British naval power and the 
realm’s commerce overseas. 
150
 
 
Perhaps no study could quantify the macro-economic costs 
incurred by the British economy from the failed attempt by the Hanoverian 
state to retain control over thirteen colonies in North America? Modern 
historiography concurs with views of the day which observed that the 
conflict had inflicted serious geopolitical and economic setbacks to the 
nation’s ambition to rise to a position of political and economic hegemony 
in the world at large. 151 
 
A decade later Britain was at war again and although it may never 
be possible to construct balance of payments accounts that could bring a 
really long term perspective on the economic significance of 
the warfare with France, from 1793 to 1815, Cuenca-Esterban has  
 
 
150 Contemporary views (e.g. McPherson, Annals of Commerce vol. 4 (London, 1805) 
and post hoc assessments have been critically summarized and supported by S. 
Conway, The British Isles and the American War of Independence; P. Marshal, The 
Making and Unmaking of Empires, Britain, India and America (Oxford, 2005); Ehrman, 
The Younger Pitt.; A. Christie, Wars and Revolutions 1760-1815 (London, 1982); M. 
Turner, The Age of Unease, 1782-1832 (Stroud, 2000);Bowen, War and British Society; 
D. Syrett, Shipping and the American War, 1775-83 (London, 1970); Nash, ‘The 
Organization of Trade and Finance’; Koehn, The Power of Commerce; Page, Britain 
and the Seventy Years War. 
151 J. Cuenca Esterban, ‘Balance of Payments and India’s Contribution to the British 
Balance of Payments, 1757-1812,’ in Explorations in Economic History, 44 (2007), pp. 
154-76; P. Marshal (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 2 and his essay, 
‘The Eighteenth Century Empire,’ in J. Black (ed., British Politics and Society from 
Walpole to Pitt (London, 1990) pp. 177-200; H.M.. Scott, British Foreign Policy in the 
Age of the American Revolution (Oxford, 1990), p. 342, recognized that Britain’s 
“success ultimately depended on the existence of a strong and aggressive French 
State – a point documented convincingly by B . Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat. 
The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783 (London, 2007) 
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However tried to recalibrate official and other data for exports, imports and 
re-exports and published plausible estimates, in current prices, for net 
earnings derived from supplying shipping, banking, insurance, mercantile, 
military and the services of imperial governance to the world economy 
(including Ireland and India) for the period 1772 to 1820.  He has also 
ventured to construct controlled conjectures for the costs of servicing 
Britain’s balance of net indebtedness to foreigners. 152 This truncated but 
hard-won set of plausible macro- economic estimates allows for a 
foreshortened perspective on the conjuncture from 1793-1815 that 
exposes the place of warfare and colonization in narratives seeking to 
explain the origins and evolution of the comparative advantages enjoyed 
by Britain in servicing a globalizing world economy from 1793 to 1914. 
Although increasing returns accruing from the realm’s precocious 
industrialization continue to be analysed in depth and sophistication its 
connexions to prior developments in shipping, financial, commercial, 
governmental services and ship-building for the kingdom’s seaborne 
trades and increasingly for world commerce at large has moved away 
from centre stage in the writing of British economic history in recent 
decades. 
153
 
 
Yet there is a historiographical tradition favoured by previous 
generations of economic historians (led by Ralph Davis) who insisted on 
according strong significance to international trade and commerce. 154 
Their emphases may have been qualified they have not been 
undermined. Cuenca-Esteban’s new data should now be included in 
narratives of the Industrial Revolution to make the point that the maritime 
sector of the British economy not only recovered from the conflict with the 
American colonies and their European allies (when returns from exports, 
re-exports and commercial services faltered) but took a leap upward to an 
altogether higher plateau of possibilities and opportunities during the long 
conflict with Revolutionary France. 155 
 
152   References to his impressive archival-based scholarship are listed in Prados De La 
Escosura (ed.), Exceptionalism and Industrialization which includes an essay by J. 
Cuenca Esterban, ‘Comparative Patterns of colonial Trade: Britain and its Rivals,’ pp. 
35-66. 
153 Allen, British Industrial Revolution and Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy. The 
Economic History of Britain (London, 2009); M. Daunton, Progress and Poverty. An 
Economic and Social History of Britain 1700-1850 (Oxford, 1995). But vide Vires, 
State and Economy (2015). 
154 R. Unger, (ed.), Shipping and Economic Growth (Leiden, 2011); R.Davis, Rise of the 
English Shipping Industry; The Industrial Revolution and BritishOverseas Trade; Cain 
and Hopkins, British Imperialism. 
155 S. Ville: English Shipping during the Industrial Revolution, 1770-1830 (1987); Gauci, 
Emporium of the World. The Merchants of London; Harper, English Navigation Laws and 
Hope, New History of British Shipping..
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For that sector’s core activity, namely shipping, the index required 
to support the key hypothesis for any chapter of a mercantilist narrative is 
aspirational because ideally it should measure cycles and trends in 
Britain’s share of total ton miles of the world’s freight carried overseas in 
British owned and built ships from, say, 1651-1851.  In print we now have 
Cuenca-Esterban’s conjectures of earnings from shipping for the years 
1772-1820. They fall into line with several sets of official statistics 
submitted to Parliament by the Registrar General of Shipping. 156   His 
reports published in Journals of the House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers and books by commentators of the day recorded: 
 
 
(a) the numbers and tonnage of vessels registered as British, Irish and 
 
Imperial ships; 
 
(b) the overall size of the workforce of seamen (men and boys) 
 
employed to man these ships; 
 
(c) shares of the tons of freight clearing (entering and leaving) British 
and Irish ports in British, Irish and Imperial (ie non-foreign) ships. 
(d) The numbers and tonnage of vessels constructed within Britain and 
its empire and registered as British, Irish and Imperial ships. 157 
 
 
The Registrar’s reports and data indicate the share of freight carried 
into and out from the kingdom’s ports usually declined in wartime when the 
regulations for navigation confining overseas trade to imperial shipping had 
to be relaxed to allow neutral vessels to replace imperial merchant ships 
and their crews who had been redeployed to serve in and for the Royal 
Navy. Between 1793 and 1815 that changed in three respects. First, 
tonnage of freight clearing imperial ports in “British ships” rose sharply. 
Secondly, the tonnage constructed and registered as “British built” also 
increased over this period. Thirdly, while the war for American 
independence seems to have been a serious setback for the upward 
progression of the kingdom’s shipping and shipbuilding industries, the 
longer and more expensive conflict with Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars witnessed a pronounced expansion in Britain’s capacities to build 
ships and to transport domestic, imperial and foreign freight by sea to every  
_______________ 
156 These data are printed in appendices to Journals of the House of Commons, vols. 
57-71. 
157 C. Moreau, The State of trade of Great Britain with All Parts of the World (London, 
1822); Parkinson (ed.),Trade Winds, 1793-1814. 
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port throughout the world economy. 158   That capacity had certainly been 
augmented at the expense of enemies, rivals and competitors, as the 
outcome of warfare at sea (and to some extent on land) leading to a 
divergence from France and all other rivals for the gains from trade and 
commerce. 
 
Alternative hypotheses that the rise of Britain’s shipping and 
shipbuilding industries emanated basically through higher rates of total 
factor productivity growth compared to the industries of its rivals must also 
be considered. That notion is untested and looks improbable. Few 
contemporaries or historians made the claim and the state continued for 
decades after 1815, to subsidize and protect both these industries. 159 
 
For shipbuilding there are almost no indications in print for 
productivity change for a multinational industry producing a heterogeneous 
range of ships designed for a range of specialized tasks, located around the 
coasts of Eurasia. The secondary literature suggests that the designs, 
technologies, techniques and skills utilized to construct ships for particular 
purposes were accessible to many firms in several European countries, the 
United States and India. Innovations could, moreover, be copied fairly 
easily from purchased or captured foreign boats, and from models and 
blueprints. Technologies and skilled workers migrated easily. Best practice 
and designs diffused readily from shipyard to shipyard. Economies derived 
from agglomeration, specialization, the accumulation of skills, superior 
management and organization must, however, have emerged from site to 
site and reduced costs of production below average in some countries 
before others. 160 Although the Royal Dockyards operated to train the 
industry’s skilled labour, the limited range of secondary sources published 
on the construction of sailing ships for this period leaves us with nothing 
more secure better than general impressions. Dutch shipyards seem to  
 
158 J. Marshall, A Digest of all the Accounts (London, 1833); Bayley, Tables showing 
the Progress of the Shipping Industry (Goldsmith’s Collection, London 1844). 
159 Davis in his magnus opus Industrial Revolution and Overseas Trade made no such 
claim and the state protection see Harper, English Navigation Laws; Admiralty Papers 
at the Public Record Office 106/1457, 106/1481, 106/2055, 49/94, 95/85 dealing with 
relations between the Navy Board and private yards complain about the lack of 
improvement in shipbuilding techniques. Commissioners for Naval Enquiry 
(Parliamentary Papers 1805 (2) and 1817 (4)) found no significant examples of 
technological change in shipbuilding for the Royal Navy from 1608 to 1805.  
160   G.P. Naish, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding,’ in C. Singer et al (eds.), History of 
Technology. Vol. 5 (Oxford, 1963), ch. 18. A more extensive literature on the 
construction of battleships suggests that technologies for the design and construction 
of sailing ships changed slowly and innovations diffused fairly rapidly. Naval historians 
do not make strong claims for national superiorities in the construction of battleships. 
See Rodger, Command of the Oceans and D.H. Roberts (ed.), Eighteenth Century 
Shipbuilding. Remarks on the English-Dutch Navies (Rotherfield, 1992); J. Glete, 
Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building (Stockholm, 1993); R. 
Morriss, Foundations of British Maritime Supremacy; B. Lavery, Ships of the Line. The 
Development of the Battle Fleet, 2 vols (London, 1983-84).
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retained the competitive position they had built up over the centuries. 161 
Access to cheap sources of raw materials (timber, pitch, tar, 
hemp, copper and iron) required to build fully rigged and equipped ships 
ready to sail the world’s seas and oceans were foundational for 
competitive advantages.162 Shipyards tended to move away from larger 
port cities, like London and Amsterdam, in search of far cheaper 
supplies of labour. For example, by the time of the American Revolution 
(1776) something like 40% of the tonnage of ships registered in Britain’s 
imperial mercantile marine had been constructed in yards located along 
the coasts of colonies in North America (and to a minor extent in India) 
close to supplies of raw materials and labour, cheaper by far than inputs 
available to yards in or near the capital. Indeed, London’s high wages 
also promoted the migration of shipbuilding to “out ports” up the coast 
and around the Isles towards pools of cheaper labour in the North, 
Scotland and Ireland. 163 Wars for American independence operated to 
expand the shipbuilding and shipping industries of the United States 
along with those of its allies - the Netherlands, France, Spain, 
Scandinavia and Russia - into more serious rivals for the gains from 
servicing international trade and commerce. Competition intensified after 
the Peace of Paris and shows up in the new estimates for earnings from 
freight (1772-92). Meanwhile the performance of British shipping and 
shipbuilding worried mercantilist statesmen for more than a decade 
before the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France in 1793. 164  
 
____________________________ 
161 J. Lucassen and R. Unger, ‘Labour Productivity on Ocean Shipping, 1500-1850,’ in 
International Journal of Maritime History, 12 (2000), pp. 127-42; R. Unger, Dutch 
Shipbuilding before 1800 (Amsterdam, 1978); D. Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial 
Empires. England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism 1650- 
1770 (Cambridge, 2003). 
162 A. Kirkaldy, British Shipping, its Organization and Importance (London, 1944); Ville, 
English Shipping; Harper, English Navigation Laws. 
163 K. Morgan, Bristol and the Atlantic Trade in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 
1993); Harper, England’s Navigation Laws; G. Walton, ‘Sources of Productivity Change 
in American Colonial Shipping 1675-1775,’ in Economic History Review, 20 (1967) pp. 
67-78; Syrett, Shipping. 
164 C R. Morriss, Naval Power and British Culture, 1760-1850. Public Trust and 
Government Ideology, (Aldershot, 2004); Cuenca Esterban, ‘Balance of Payments’; H.T. 
Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the American Revolution. D. Syrett, Shipping and the American 
War, 1775-83 (New York, 1970). Vide the pamphlets published by Lord Sheffield on the 
theme of ‘Strictures on the Necessity of Maintaining the Navigation and Colonial System 
of Great Britain’ (1804 Goldsmiths Collection, University of London Library) and J. 
Ehrman The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe, 1783-1793 
(London,1962); J.E. Crowley, ‘Neo-Mercantilism and the Wealth of Nations: British 
Commercial Policy after the American revolution,’ in Historical Journal, 33 (1994), pp. 
334-60. 
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Thereafter and for some twenty- two years international competition 
for seaborne freight took place in a geopolitical environment of 
warfare and disruptions to international commerce from which 
Britain’s shipping, shipbuilding and allied industries eventually 
emerged in clear positions of primacy. 
 
This outcome has been well documented by historians, trade by 
trade, and has been referenced in classic texts dealing with growth and 
cycles for the British economy as a whole from 1789 to 1819.165 The 
triumphal re-emergence of these two major industries from doldrums that 
accompanied the global conflict for American independence and from the 
fluctuations in their fortunes due to the ups and downs of twenty-two 
years of mercantilist warfare at sea, as well as on land, can be validated 
with reference to official and familiar values (the proxy for volumes) of 
retained imports, domestic exports and re-exports for 1774-1821. 166 
 
Latterly and thanks to the seminal research of Cuenca-Esterban 
who has reconstructed a comprehensive set of balance of payments 
accounts in current prices for the period 1772-1820, historians are now 
placed to offer plausible conjectures based upon acceptable data that 
reveals the evolution  of major intera-relations between the British 
economy and the rest of the world over initial and critical stages of the 
First Industrial Revolution. His estimates enables us to survey those 
connexions before, during and after European warfare that accompanied 
the American War for Independence and to analyse outcomes imputable 
to wars on land and above all at sea with France and her allies from 
1772-75 to 1816-20. 
 
 
 
 
165 Parkinson (ed.), Trade Winds. The secondary sources providing dense description 
trade by trade is surveyed by P.K. O’Brien, Government Revenue 1793-1815 (D.Phil. 
thesis, Oxford, 1967) ch. 9. On growth and fluctuations at more macro levels in imports, 
exports and re-exports the classic studies are by Ashton, Economic Fluctuations; 
Gayer et al, Growth and Fluctuations and Crouzet, Le blocus: W. Schlote, British 
Overseas Trade, 1700-1930 (London, 1952). 
166   Mitchell, Abstract, p. 281; appendices to Journals of the House of Commons, vols. 
51-71. Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers; Marshal, Digest of all the Accounts; 
Moreau, State of Trade; C. Moreau, Chronological Records of the British Royal and 
Commercial Navies (Goldsmiths Collection, London, 1827). The approach to Britain’s 
foreign commerce exemplified by the works of Ashton, Gayer and Crouzet 
cited above may leave the impression that the war years generated not only instability 
but  depressed the prospects for British trade.  That was not the view of the day – vide. 
A.D. Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century; Ehrman, The Younger Pitt. The 
Consuming Struggle; and G. Bayley, Tables Showing the Progress of the Shipping 
Industry and A. Bayley, Tables Showing the Progress of the Shipping Industry of the 
British Empire (London, 1844).
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Cuenca-Esterban is generous in his references to the archival 
scholarship of others and appropriately cautious about data that he 
continues to refine and revise. I have recast his estimates in order to draw 
inferences that fall into line with contemporary views of Britain’s 
international economic relations and standing vis à vis its competitors for 
this critical conjuncture in the Island’s history. 
   Estimates of External Flows to and from Great Britain and the Rest of the World 1772-75 to 1816-20 in £ million in Current Prices 
 
Categories 
 
1. Domestic Exports (fob) 
1772-75 
 
13.7 
1176-83 
 
12.4 
1784-92 
 
19.2 
1793-1802 
 
32.2 
1803-07 
 
37.3 
1808-15 
 
43.2 
1816-20 
 
41.5 
2. Re-exports (fob) 7.0 5.2 5.1 10.8 10.0 15.9 13.5 
3. Imports (cif)        
includes a guess for illegal imports 22.3 21.2 27.5 45.5 52.6 62.0 59.9 
4. Retained Imports (3-2) 15.3 16.0 22.4 34.7 42.6 46.1 46.4 
5. Balance of Commodities Trade        
(Net Imports or Deficit (4-1)) -1.6 -3.6 -3.2 -2.5 -5.3 -2.9 -4.9 
6. Balance on Services Account        
from Shipping, Insurance and        
Mercantile Profits 4.0 5.2 4.9 10.6 10.3 14.2 8.3 
7. Balance of Commodities and        
Services (6-5) 2.4 1.6 1.7 8.1 5.0 11.3 3.4 
8. Net Transfers To and From        
Rest of the World        
(a) Theatres of warfare 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -4.4 -2.3 -16.2 -0.6 
(b) India 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 
(c) Migrants -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Total Transfers 0.3 0.2 0.9 -4.2 -2.5 -16.8 -0.9 
(d) Debt Servicing Charges        
(-) or Receipts (+) 0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 1.8 2.1 2.3 
9. Balance on Current Account 2.5 0.9 2.2 3.8 4.4 -2.4 4.9 
10. Capital Account        
(a) Changes in Reserves 2.9 0.2 1.8 0.6 0.7 -0.3 1.6 
(b) Inflows or Outflows of Capital -0.4 0.7 0.4 3.2 3.8 -2.1 3.3 
11. Net Accumulated Balance of -13.0 -7.8 -4.5 27.7 46.6 30.0 46.4 
Claims against Foreigners        
 
Sources: Data reconstructions by J. Cuenca Esteban in papers cited in Bibliography to L. Prados De La Escosura (ed.) Exceptionalism and 
Industrialization. Britain and its European Rivals, 1688-1815 (Cambridge, 2004) and his article: ‘The British Balance of Payments, Indian 
Transfers and War Finance,’ in Economic History Review, 54 (2001), pp. 58-86. 
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Several points (not unfamiliar to historians of the period) have been 
clarified by Cuenca-Esterban’s research. For example, he shows 
domestic exports first declined, then recovered slowly from the American 
War of Independence and despite periods of boom and crises associated 
with the conflict with Revolutionary France increased over time in volume 
at a much faster rate between 1789 -1819 than they had over the two 
decades preceding 1793. The wartime upswing was marked by shifts in 
their composition (heavily into cotton textiles) and a clear geographical 
diversification - away from Europe towards markets in India, China, Latin 
America and, above all, the United States. 167  
 
Correlation is not causation but after a protracted and unresolved 
debate on linkages between exports and industrialization it has now been 
recognized that an overall view of that contested connexion could only be 
pursued towards a settled conclusion by locating and analysing case by 
case, cycle by cycle, commodity by commodity evidence for  changes in 
the range of overseas markets for British commodities that became 
accessible during these wars. 168  Meanwhile theoretically inspired 
exercises based on British statistics and founded upon models designed 
to separate out and to quantify endogeneous compared to exogeneous 
forces behind an accelerated rate of growth in industrial output and the 
rapid but erratic expansion of exports from a base period before the war 
(1788-92, down to its immediate aftermath (1816-20) and upward 
thereafter through a period of settled peaceable international economic 
peaceable international economic relations (in the 1820s and 1830s) look 
ontologically unreal. 
 
 
 
_______________ 
167 Cuenca-Esteban and vide a brilliant unpublished Cambridge thesis by Simon Smith 
– summarized in Economic History Society Annual Conference, Session 7 ‘The Impact 
of the Discovery of the Americas, 1492 on Europe (Leicester, 1992). Crafts’ discussion 
of the problem in his classic text, British Economic Growth, pp. 124-36, which 
elaborates on the complexities involved in quantifying connexions with tradein a growth 
process. He insisted on the significance of exports. 
168 For recent surveys of the protracted debate on connexions between trade and 
Britain’s precocious industrialiization see K. Harley, ‘Trade discovery mercantilism and 
technology,’ in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of 
Modern Britain (Cambridge, 2004), p. 175-204 and J. Cuenca Esterban, ‘The Rising 
Share of British Industrial Exports in Industrial Output 1700-1851.’ In Journal of 
Economic History, 52 (1997) pp. 879-906 and ‘Comparative Patterns of Colonial Trade 
and India’s contribution to the British Balance of Payments; P. Maw, ‘Yorkshire and 
Lancashire Ascendant: England’s Textile Exports to New York and Philadelphia,’ in 
Economic History Review, 62 (2009) pp. 1-35. The long-run significance of trade may 
have been settled by a seminal econometric exercise by G. Clark et al., ‘The Growing 
Dependence of Britain on Trade during the Industrial Revolution,’ in Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, 62 (2014), pp. 109-36.
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Complex “loops of inter-connexions” between British industry and 
its imperial and foreign markets overseas will probably remain 
impossible to disentangle.  Theories imported from an array of 
competing models available in economics journals in order to engage 
with a utopian aspiration of factoring out the manifold influences on the 
growth and fluctuations in industrial exports flowing overseas during 
some twenty- two years of warfare and its aftermath could be 
represented as conclusive and not been tested. 
169
 
 
Yes, conflicts at sea augmented risks for merchants trading 
beyond the shores of the realm. But they also widened opportunities, 
opened up new markets, degraded foreign competition, augmented fiscal 
and monetary incentives and offered naval protection to an extended 
range of nouveau businessmen, shippers and bankers (who included 
asylum seekers from the mainland), described at the time by the 
mercantile establishment as socially inferior “speculators” who engaged 
recklessly with overseas trade and commerce in wartime. 
170 According 
to Crafts, shares of industrial output despatched, funded and insured for 
sale overseas, jumped from 22% in 1780 to reach 53% by 1831. 
Cuenca-Esteban’s revision to Craft’s estimates suggest an even more 
pronounced leap from 14% to 46% over that same period. 
171   Export 
volumes certainly rose more rapidly than manufactured outputs during 
the wars which thereby compensated industry’s need for markets at a 
time when domestic demand was being depressed by ever higher rates 
of taxation. Some (and probably a “substantial”) part of the rising share 
of total domestic industrial output sold overseas over these years can 
surely be attributable to the relative advantages that the British economy 
derived from the power of its Navy at sea and because fiscal and 
financial policies pursued by the government operated to promote trade 
and commerce with places beyond the impact of taxation, which 
narrowed markets at home.172 During the wars from 1793 to 1815 Britain 
recovered, consolidated, and thereafter retained a hegemonic position as 
the world’s “emporium” for trans- 
 
 
169 J.G. Williamson, New Views on the Impact of the French Wars on Accumulation in 
Britain (Harvard University Discussion Paper 14890, 1990) for a defence of economic 
theories that purport to “factor out” wars. 
170   P.K. O’Brien, ‘Merchants and Bankers as Patriots or Speculators. Foreign Commerce 
and Monetary Policy in Wartime,’ in J. McCusker and K. Morgan (eds.), The Early 
Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, 2000). This book also includes chapters by Engerman 
and Crouzet concerned with trade. The classic article on commerce for this period is 
Crouzet, ‘Wars , Blockades and Economic Change in Europe’. 
171 Cuenca-Esterban, ‘The Rising Share of Industrial Exports.’ 
172 J. Beckett and Turner, ‘Taxation and Economic Growth, pp. 377-403
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continental trade and commerce. 173 That outcome can be read as the 
restoration of a trajectory in operation from 1651 down to the loss the 
American colonies in 1783. Its progression was interrupted between the 
years of 1772-75 and 1790-93 (years that preceded, accompanied and 
followed the war for American Independence) and the outbreak of the 
French Revolution – a period when volumes and values of re-exports 
distributed, financed, insured and shipped across continents by British 
commercial enterprises remained almost flat. Fortuitously, during the wars 
from 1793-1815 geopolitical conditions affecting the operations of 
international trade and commerce changed in ways that, on balance, 
redounded to the long-term advantage of the British economy.  
 
Prices for shipping, insuring, financing and organizing the carriage of 
freight overseas all rose to very high levels. Under superior protection 
from the Royal Navy British mercantile firms responded to opportunities 
and “captured” extraordinary shares of the returns from the sale of the 
commercial services associated with the distribution of both domestically 
produced and foreign commodities to European, American and other 
world markets. 174 
 
At the time contemporaries became well aware of the gains from 
the accelerated rise of London and other British ports to become far and 
away the leading entrepôts for world commerce through the rhetoric of 
politicians, who referred with pride to official data recording large 
increases in imports and re-exports. Ministers also recognized, debated 
and investigated the recurrent and cyclical problems of “gluts” of foreign 
produce (mercantile inventories) lying unsold in the realm’s warehouses 
when the French and American governments managed to block and 
disrupt normal channels for British shipping. 175 
 
173 C.N. Parkinson, Britannia Rules. The Classic Age of Naval History, 1793-1815 
(London, 1977); P. Gauci, Emporium of the World depicts the London emporium at work 
and Hancock and other historians have explained how, when and why Britain acquired 
such extraordinary shares of the gains from servicing world trade – Chapman, Merchant 
Enterprise in Britain; A. Olson, Making the Empire Work: London and American Interest 
(Cambridge, Mass. 1992); D. Hancock, ‘The British Atlantic World: Coordination, 
Complexity and the Emergence of an Atlantic Market Economy 1651-1815,’in Itinerario, 
No. 23 (1999), pp.107-26. 
174 A. Robson, A History of the Royal Navy. The Napoleonic Wars (London, 2014). 
Parkinson (ed.), Trade Winds; Wright and Fayle, Lloyds; Moreau, State of the Trade of 
Great Britain; Bayley, Tables showing the Progress of the Shipping Interest of the British 
Empire; C. Shammas, ‘The Revolutionary Impact of European Demand for Tropical 
Goods,’ in McCuster and Morgan, The Early Atlantic Economy, pp. 163-86 discusses the 
inelastic nature of European demand for these exotic and luxury products. 
175 Harvey, Britain in the Early Nineteenth Century, chs 2 and 3. The official statistics 
were recorded in parliamentary papers and journals of the House of Commons. The 
inventory cycles of the period are analysed by Ashton, Economic Fluctuations, Gayer 
et al, Growth and Fluctuations and in Crouzet’s magnus opus, Le blocus. The most 
recent study of world trade in wartime is by K.O’Rouke, ‘The Worldwide Economic 
Impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815,’ in Journal of 
Global History, 1 (2006), pp. 123-51. He also concluded that Britain gained relative to its 
rivals from the wartime disruption of an evolution towards the integration of global 
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75  
 
By value approximately three quarters of the returns from this 
commercial activity came from shipping tropical groceries (sugar, tea, 
coffee, spices, tobacco etc) and raw materials (cotton fibres, thrown silk, 
dyestuffs, hardwoods etc) from Asia, Africa and the Americas onto the 
mainland of Europe. Marine insurance also prospered in risky wartime 
conditions, but shipping retained its place as the most significant sub- 
sector supplying international services. 176 
 
By the end of the war sales of commercial, financial, insurance and 
other services to continents and colonies beyond Europe and North 
America accounted for nearly 90% of Britain’s invisible exports. While 
warfare and dangers to external security of the realm lasted the 
augmented revenues from these services to foreign and colonized 
economies alike turned out to be more than sufficient to cover the deficit 
on commodity trade. With help from plunder and extortion from India they 
became sufficient to fund deficits on commodity trade (equivalent to some 
6% to 12% of retained imports) and to cover payments for naval and 
military operations overseas – restrained to fairly low levels before the 
commitment of a large army under Wellington to fight on the mainland of 
Europe from 1808-15. 177 
 
Thus and as Cuenca-Esterban’s constructed estimates for 
international flows become acceptable as controlled conjectures they will 
allow historians to represent the war years as marking a turning point 
when the British economy (with indispensable help from the Royal Navy) 
became transformed from a net debtor to a net creditor to the rest 
of the world. 178 Between 1816-20 the kingdom’s assets located beyond its 
frontiers may have amounted to somewhere around £50 million 
(approximately 14% of the national income). By then Britons may have 
been receiving  inflows of returns from their investments overseas 
sufficient to fund about 7% of the country’s retained imports. 179 
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Once the conflict was over and the advantages of naval protection 
and predation upon foreign (and neutral shipping) and other extortions 
associated with mercantilist warfare came to an end, European and 
American competitors recovered some of the international commerce 
they had lost in wartime from financing and transhipping commodities by 
sea around the world. Nevertheless Britain’s top position had been 
secured. A liberal international economic order gradually emerged under 
the benign hegemony of the Royal Navy, the Island economy retained 
and built upon the extraordinary shares of the profits “seized” during an 
age of mercantilism from supplying: shipping, marine insurance, 
commercial and entrepôt services for the rest of the world economy 
(including its own  extended empire overseas). 180 
 
From 1815 to 1914 (the century of Pax Britannica) the economic 
significance of international services closely connected to the world’s 
leading shipbuilding industry (both jacked up along with the Royal Navy to 
positions of almost unassailable primacy during the wars with France) has 
been mapped statistically by Imlah’s classical study of 1958.As early as 
1806 the foreign secretary had recommended: “The sea is ours and we 
must maintain the doctrine that no nation, no fleet, no cock-boat shall sail 
upon it without our permission.” 181 
 
Geopolitical conjunctures in history when the long run growth of 
national economies might well have been thrown off course in developing 
comparative advantages that depended upon the maintenance of external 
security and the retention of naval supremacy over rival powers 
competing for gains from trade and specialization (linked to technological 
change) are complex to model. 182 Early modern international history has 
never been an ontologically convenient arena for economic theories, 
however, rigorously designed to test connexions between trade and 
growth, except by resorting to unreal counterfactuals of peace with free 
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trade derived from Adam Smith’s premature advocacy of a more 
enlightened international economic order. If, however, we reread Imlah’s 
book and take account of the insights of “Gentlemanly Capitalism”, we will 
then reflect upon the shares of imports retained, consumed and utilized by 
the economy of the United Kingdom from 1815-20 to 1911-13 that were 
funded by net receipts from the sale of services to the empire and the rest 
of the world, supplemented over time in ever increasing proportion over 
time from inflows of dividends and interest from investments overseas. 
Historians cannot avoid the question of how, when and why that pattern of 
specialization (with externalities) connected to long run growth of the 
economy came to pass and was sustained for more than a century. 
183 
From a post hoc perspective it seems anachronistic to underestimate the 
kingdom’s pursuit of a mercantilist strategy for development or to ignore 
the massive expenditures incurred to defeat Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France? After all, national  versions of mercantilism were supported by the 
mainstream of European economic thought between 1651 and 1846 and 
accepted as a sensible foundation for geopolitical policy by all  British 
Parliaments and governments of the day. 184   Smithian views continued to 
be as deviant and premature as universal suffrage, religious toleration, 
rights for women, sexual freedom and other demands for “enlightenment” 
until well into the nineteenth century. An Industrial Enlightenment 
succeeded rather than preceded Britain’s precocious transition to a 
modern industrial market economy. 185 
 
After Trafalgar and Waterloo the economic ramifications and 
significance of Britain’s victory over Revolutionary and Napoleonic France 
were widely recognized by European statesmen intellectuals and historians 
as a conjuncture in European and global history that marked the beginning 
of the end of that malign international economic order. 186 
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Mercantilism may continue to retain its status as an irrational 
system of thought among economists who continue to read centuries of 
European writing in political economy teleologically as economic theory 
in retrospect. 187 Historians don’t read it that way and will to insist on 
representing the policies pursued by statesmen and the texts of their 
economic advisers in the context of an unavoidable geopolitical order in 
the context. Historically, as Crouzet told us years ago, the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars find their genesis in a sequence of conflicts 
between Britain and France going back for more than a century.188 
 
Meanwhile to claim superiority for the insights derivable from 
attempts based on a modern economic theory and to factor wars or the 
history of mercantilism from an otherwise peaceful, but utopian, process 
of long run economic growth and transformation) are anachronistic 
exercises in theoretical speculation. Wars and the economic ideology 
which accompanied them were anything but enlightened, but they were 
part and parcel of that whole process and era. At its culmination it was 
important to win in order to consolidate the gains from trade, commerce 
and colonization culminating since 1651 to promote the kingdom’s 
transition to become the world’s first industrial market economy. 189 
 
My rhetorical and debateable perception is that in significant  
respects the First Industrial Revolution can be plausibly represented as 
the paradigm example of successful mercantilism and that the 
unintended consequences of the Revolution in France contributed 
positively  and perhaps “substantially” to its ultimate consolidation and 
progression.190 
_____________________ 
187 A perusal of Lane, Profits from Power, might be more heuristic and vide N. 
Hampson, The Perfidy of Albion: French Perceptions of England during the French 
revolution (London, 1998). The essays on Heckscher’s studies of ‘Mercantilism and 
the Continental System by Magnusson, Irwin, Mokyr, Lal, Crouzet, Davis and 
Engerman and O’Brien in parts IV and V of R. Findlay et al (eds.) Heckscher, 
International, Trade and Economic History and J. Nye War, Wine and Taxes 
(Princeton, 
2007)  also debate the issue. 
188F. Crouzet, ‘The Second Hundred Years War’ and throughout his books, Britain 
Ascendant: Studies in Franco-British History (Cambridge, 1990), and including his last 
book, La guerre economique Franco-anglaise au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 2008); J. Black, 
Natural and Necessary Enemies. Anglo-French Relations in the Eighteenth Century 
(London, 1986). 
189 D.A. Baugh, ‘Great Britain’s Blue Water Policy, 1689-1815,’in International History 
Review, X (1988) pp. 33-58; Stone (ed.), An Imperial State at War; Crouzet, La guerre 
economique. J. Black, Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: the World Order 
Since 1500 (New York, 2007); A. Zatt, War in Human Civilization (Oxford, 2008). 
190 J. Horn et al (eds.) Reconceptualizing the Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, Mass, 
2010);P. O’Brien, ‘The Hanoverian State and the Defeat of the Continental System,’ in  
R. Findlay et al., The Hanoverian State and the Defeat of the Continental System  and 
P. Vries, State Economy and the Great Divergence.
  
 
